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My dissertation examines theoretically the effects of environmental taxation on 
welfare in various cases. Using a general equilibrium model, the first chapter shows that 
a Pigouvian tax provides a larger welfare gain than an output tax, since it induces 
substitution among inputs as well as reduction in output of the dirty good, while an 
output tax induces only the output reduction. Using data for China and the U.S., 
numerical simulation results show that the potential welfare loss from not being able to 
use a Pigouvian tax is much larger in developing countries than in developed countries. 
The second chapter focuses on the fact that recycled material needs reprocessing 
to be substitutable for virgin material. Reprocessing uses resources and, in the process, 
generates pollution. Incorporating these ‘imperfect’ characteristics into a simple general 
equilibrium model, I examine how these realistic factors affect the structure of tax-
subsidy schemes when the Pigouvian taxes are not available. A generalized Deposit-
Refund system can achieve the optimum if illegal dumping is not taxable. Without a 
Pigouvian tax on illegal dumping, recycling is subsidized for its role in diverting illegal 
 
 viii
disposal into proper disposal. If Pigouvian taxes on neither illegal disposal nor waste 
from imperfect reprocessing are available, a combination of output tax on reprocessed 
material and subsidies for clean inputs can be used to restore the optimum. In the 
process, another reason to subsidize recycling emerges: recycling is a clean input for 
imperfect reprocessing. 
The third chapter focuses on the validity of the results obtained in the first 
chapter in the case of two vertically-separated oligopolies where the upstream industry 
is polluting. Using an analytical partial equilibrium model, I show that a tax on 
pollution is potentially superior to a tax on intermediate good, since the former can 
utilize both the upstream firms’ input substitutability and the downstream firms’ input 
substitutability, while a tax on intermediate good only utilizes the downstream firms’ 
input substitutability. I also derive the conditions that government can improve social 
welfare through various revenue-neutral tax reforms.  
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Welfare Effects of the Environmental Taxes 
in Developing Countries 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many developed countries have implemented various policy measures to protect 
and improve the quality of their environment. Recent studies (OECD, 1995; 1996) have 
identified major advantages to a greater use of ‘economic instruments’ (EIs) such as 
taxes or charges and tradable permits in environmental policy, compared to ‘command 
and control’ (CAC) approaches. However, EIs are heterogeneous policy tools. The 
textbook case of a Pigouvian tax is far from widely used, mainly due to the information 
requirements and other institutional constraints (McMorran and Nellor, 1994). The 
successful implementation of EIs might heavily depend on pre-existing institutional 
conditions (see, for example, Russell and Powell, 1996; Smith, 1997). 
These institutional conditions are particularly unfavorable in developing 
countries. Existing regulations, usually fashioned after those in developed countries, 
have often proven unenforceable and impractical. The efforts required to cope with the 
design of these policies and institutional changes for launching EIs are additional 
burdens on those developing nations (Panayotou, 1991; Serôa da Motta, et al 1999).  
Developing countries also have other structural characteristics different from those of 
developed countries. They often use more polluting fuels such as coal and unleaded 
gasoline, engage in more-harmful and less-efficient consumption and production 
activities such as slash-and-burn farming in Brazil, and drive more polluting vehicles 
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per mile traveled such as small scooters in many South Asian countries. Finally, they 
tend to have agricultural that are large and often under-taxed, polluting industries that 
account for a large proportion of total output, and high marginal environmental 
damages per unit of output. 
This chapter examines how these constraints affect the welfare gain from the 
introduction of environmental taxes in developing countries. It uses a simple analytical 
general equilibrium model with three sectors: one taxable clean manufacturing sector, 
one polluting manufacturing sector, and one non-taxable clean sector that represents 
subsistence farming and/or small non-market production activities. 
First, this chapter theoretically shows that an ideal Pigouvian tax provides larger 
welfare gain than an output tax. Leaving aside problems of monitoring or enforcement, 
a Pigouvian tax is an ideal instrument to internalize an environmental externality 
because it reduces consumption of the output as well as use of the dirty input. Since 
emissions themselves are often hard to measure, however, both developed and 
developing countries have often relied on the taxation of output of the polluting 
industry. Using the log-linearization technique, this chapter solves for the second-best 
optimal Pigouvian tax and output tax in the presence of a distortionary tax on market 
use of labor (or equivalently, a pre-existing consumption tax on all market goods). 
Second, the model allows structural constraints to be incorporated and 
quantified through a set of parameter values rather than relies on anecdotal evidence 
that developing countries have experienced. The chapter uses data for China, which is 
believed to share many characteristics commonly observed in developing countries in a 
broad sense. Using the data for China, I calculate the net welfare effects of either using 
the ideal Pigouvian tax instead using an output tax. The numerical simulation results 
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show that the net welfare gain from the use of a Pigouvian tax could be more than four 
times larger than that of an output tax. On the other hand, the welfare gain from using a 
Pigouvian tax is only 50 percent larger than that of an output tax in developed countries. 
Therefore, the potential welfare disadvantage from using output taxes for environmental 
purposes appears to be greater in developing countries. This potential welfare 
disadvantage implies that developing countries’ efforts in various structural reforms 
have important effects on the welfare outcomes of their environmental policies. 
Moreover, the welfare disadvantage does not imply that developing countries should 
avoid using environmental output tax instruments. Although an introduction of an 
environmental output tax offers smaller welfare gain in developing countries than in 
developed countries, the welfare gain from output tax instruments might be substantial, 
considering the potential savings from monitoring and enforcement activities. 
Section 1.2 briefly overviews past experiences with EIs, while Section 1.3 
reviews the previous literature. In Section 1.4, I present the model and derive the 
optimal tax rates and net welfare expressions for both the emissions tax and output tax. 
Section 1.5 discusses the implications of these analytical results, while Section 1.6 
presents simulation results. Section 1.7 concludes. 
 
1.2 PAST EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 
The traditional and most direct approach to environmental management is to 
impose technology restrictions and guidelines, enforced using fines and fees. But this 
CAC method can be difficult and expensive to implement, monitor, and enforce. In the 
economic literature, the CAC approach has been deplored on grounds of both static and 
dynamic inefficiency, because it asks for the same level of compliance by all polluters 
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despite differences in marginal abatement costs. Furthermore, it does not provide any 
incentives to polluters for technical improvement to reduce pollution in the future 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988; Cropper and Oates, 1992). 
EIs include both taxes and permit systems, but the model in this chapter is based 
on perfect certainty and thus does not really distinguish between them. Since taxes and 
permits are equivalent, I refer only to Pigouvian taxes (fees or charges) and 
environmental output taxes.1 A Pigouvian tax (or emissions tax) is a specific tax per 
unit of emissions. The optimal rate of tax is equal to the pollutant’s social marginal 
environmental damage (MED) at the socially-efficient level of emissions (Pigou, 1932). 
In theory, Pigouvian taxes reduce pollution in the least-cost manner: they encourage 
polluters to determine the combination of lower output, substitution among inputs, and 
investment in new technology that reduces emissions at least cost. 
On the other hand, taxes on output or purchased inputs might be used for 
environmental purposes, though they have traditionally been used mainly for revenue 
purposes.2 In many cases, they are intended to encourage pollution abatement by taxing 
outputs or inputs whose use is linked to environmental damage, rather than taxing 
emissions directly. Unlike a Pigouvian tax, however, an output (or input) tax achieves a 
socially-efficient level of emissions in the least-cost manner only if the nature of the 
linkage between the tax base and the environmental damage is fixed. Without fixed 
linkage to pollution, they usually deliver only the output effect (Fullerton, et al, 2001). 
In other words, they do not provide incentives to abate emissions per unit of output; 
                                                 
1 Some studies (OECD, 1999b; Smith, 1997) divide environmental tax instruments into charges (or fees) 
and taxes based on whether they are requited or not. However, in this paper, I will use all these terms 
interchangeably. 
2 I will use “Pigouvian tax” for a tax per unit of emissions and “output tax” for a tax on output of the 
polluting industry. Therefore, by my definition, the most important characteristic in determining if any 
particular tax (or charge) belongs to the Pigouvian tax category depends on whether it directly hits the 
emissions themselves. If not, I will call it an output tax. 
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they only reduce consumption of goods and services produced using emissions.3 
Furthermore, they may affect other non-targeted activities (Eskeland and Jimenez, 
1992). 
Why are environmental output (or input) taxes so popular then? First of all, 
environmental output taxes are relatively easier to administer than ideal Pigouvian 
taxes. For design and implementation of a perfect Pigouvian tax, the environmental 
authorities would have to monitor the sources of pollutants continuously, enforce the 
potential polluters to comply, and decide the optimal rate of tax for each polluter. These 
administrative activities are by no means easy tasks, even in developed countries.4 The 
situations in many developing countries are worse: their institutional weaknesses such 
as under-funding and inexperience tend even further to limit the effective 
implementation of Pigouvian taxes.5 Furthermore, it is often difficult to introduce new 
environmental taxes. In comparison, output taxes are relatively easy to implement.6 
Many existing taxes are levied on the value of goods and services sold (or the value of 
incomes paid or received). For example, excise taxes on fuel and other energy products 
are probably the most widespread environmental taxes mainly because of their 
administrative convenience (OECD, 1999a). 
                                                 
3 For instance, a tax on coal intended to reduce sulfur emissions will also affect manufacturers that use 
coal to extract chemicals for dyeing. If a tax were imposed on the sulfur content of coal, the 
manufacturers in the dyeing industry would unnecessarily be induced to switch to lower-sulfur coal or to 
find other sources of chemicals (Blackman and Harrington, 2000). 
4 Political considerations or the practical problems of design and implementation such as who is to be 
taxed are often the most important factors that determine the types of policy tools employed (Barthold, 
1994). 
5 This does not necessarily imply that environmental output taxes are free from such institutional 
constraints, only that such constraints may be smaller for an output tax. 
6 Smith (1996) points out that “where the assessment, collection, or enforcement of the tax can be 
‘piggy-backed’ on to corresponding operations already established for existing taxes, the costs of an 
environmental tax measure may be significantly lower than where entirely-new administrative apparatus 
and procedures are required.” 
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A comprehensive survey of the use of EIs (OECD, 1989) reports over 150 
instances related to the purpose of environmental improvement in 14 OECD countries. 
However, many taxes and charges adopted partly for environmental reasons were 
mainly for the purpose of raising revenues. Other surveys show a rising trend in the use 
of EIs in developed countries. OECD (1994) reports the number of EIs increased almost 
50 percent just from 1987 to 1991. Covering the years 1997-1999, OECD (1999b) 
shows that all of the OECD Member countries that responded to the questionnaire (24 
out of 29) are using some types of EIs. 
However, the popularity of EIs among developed countries often blurs the true 
nature of environmental instruments: many environmental taxes titled “emission 
charges or fees” usually are not exactly Pigouvian taxes. As Fullerton, et al (2001) 
emphasize, most charges on various pollutants are not Pigouvian taxes, no matter what 
they are called. Difficulties in precisely monitoring the levels of pollutants force many 
developed countries to use less-ambitious charges or taxes on the bases that are easier to 
observe and enforce (OECD, 1999a). 
The situations in developing countries are not much different and might be 
worse.7 Technological constraints such as the use of dated technologies are mixed with 
structural constraints such as large numbers of small polluters that are hard to regulate, 
large traditional sectors, high bureaucratic cost, corruption, lack of political will, and 
severe shortage of budget and manpower. All these factors make it more difficult to 
implement EIs successfully. In China, for example, emission fees are charged on 20 
                                                 
7 In addition to the difficulties with monitoring and enforcement of effective environmental policy 
instruments, many developing countries have distinct structural characteristics different from developed 
countries. They are often characterized by a large share of agriculture in total output and employment, 
and by large share of informal (or non-taxable) economic activities (Tanzi and Zee, 2000). Due to these 
constraints, many developing countries have relied heavily on indirect consumption taxes such as sales or 
excise taxes. This paper takes advantage of the fact that a uniform consumption tax on market output is 
equivalent to a uniform tax on market labor. 
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different air pollutants. However, firms are required to pay fees only for the ‘worst case 
pollutant,’ even when more than one pollutant exceeds the permissible level. Other 
pollutants face no charge at the margin.8 Worsening these problems is that fees reduce 
firms’ tax liabilities, and that 80 percent of fees are eventually returned to these firms. 
These problems cause perverse incentives for firms to perpetuate noncompliance 
(Blackman and Harrington, 2000).9 
 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Though the literature on environmental taxes is vast, it usually assumes that 
emissions can be perfectly observable, or that a tax on the consumption good or a tax on 
a market input corresponds exactly to a tax on emissions. An early example is Sandmo 
(1975). He examines the optimal tax rate when the aggregate amount of one of the 
consumption goods enters the utility function directly as a negative externality. Thus, he 
assumes that the relation between the output and the externality is fixed, where only 
changes in output level can reduce the emissions level. In this case, a tax on emissions 
is equivalent to a tax on the output of the polluting industry. 
Cremer and Gahvari (2001) re-examine the results of Sandmo in the case where 
taxation of a consumption good is not equivalent to a tax on emissions. In a second-best 
world with distorting labor taxes, they show that taxes on emissions and on 
                                                 
8 Furthermore, actual monitoring of emissions is based only on visual inspection of the clarity of flue 
gases. Actual fees are determined in combination with estimates of emissions volumes, but many studies 
point out that the emissions fees are well below marginal abatement costs for most firms and thus provide 
limited abatement incentives (Yang, et al, 1997). 
9 In order to solve administrative difficulties in implementing an emissions tax, developing countries 
often rely on other policy instruments: product taxes on fuels in many countries, voluntary agreements 
and information disclosure such as the Clean River Program in Indonesia (O’Connor, 1998). However, 
the overall evaluation of experiences with EIs in many developing countries indicates that EIs have 
potentially increased technical and financial burdens on already-fragile institutional structures (Serôa da 
Motta, et al, 1999; McMorran and Nellor, 1994). 
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consumption goods can be set separately to address different objectives: an emission tax 
solves the externality problem while output taxes are determined in conformity with 
optimal tax considerations. However, they do not examine the magnitude of possible 
welfare losses from using an output tax instead of an emissions tax, since they still 
assume that a firm’s emission level is fully observable. 
Cropper and Oates (1992) have suggested that output taxes may be superior to 
an emissions tax if monitoring is costly. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) explicitly 
examine the importance of monitoring costs in the choice between taxes on emissions 
and taxes on outputs (or inputs). Under imperfect monitoring, they show that output 
taxes might be preferred to emissions taxes if outputs are easily substitutable and 
abatement options are scarce. Hoel (1998) also argues that emission taxes may be no 
more effective than other policies if abatement costs are uncertain and non-convex, and 
if measuring emissions is difficult. 
Vatn (1998) approaches the problem in a different way. Using a material balance 
perspective in his model, he assumes that all economic activities such as extraction, 
production, and consumption generate emissions. Normally, it becomes harder and 
more expensive to detect and mitigate them in the later stages of economic activities, 
since emissions become part of numerous inputs and outputs. If transaction costs 
internalizing the externalities outweigh the gains from hitting the target more precisely 
by using an emissions tax, the use of input-oriented taxes might be more efficient.10 
To compare alternative taxes, Fullerton, et al (2001) start by showing 
theoretically and numerically that the emissions tax raises welfare more than an output 
tax. They do not explicitly measure or model the costs of targeting the tax on pollution, 
                                                 
10 Broadly speaking, transaction costs include monitoring, enforcement, and other controlling costs 
incurred by the environmental authorities. 
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such as the costs of measurement, monitoring, and enforcement, but their numerical 
simulation results show how big those costs must be to justify the use of the output tax 
instead. In a more direct comparison, Smulders and Vollebergh (2001) explore the 
trade-off between incentive effects and administrative costs associated with the 
implementation of various environmental tax instruments. They find that the output tax 
might be favored if emissions are closely linked to the uses of output, if other 
technological abatement methods are not plentiful, and if administrative costs of the 
emissions tax are high. Others argue that output or input taxes such as fuel taxes can be 
quite effective to control air pollution in developing countries if accompanied by 
emissions standards to stimulate cleaner technologies (Eskeland, 1995; Eskeland, et al, 
1998). 
 
1.4 THE MODEL 
The developing country model has three production sectors: two taxable 
manufacturing sectors ( ) and X Y  and one non-taxable subsistence agricultural sector 
( )Z . This static model considers only one time period, with no saving decision. The N  
identical households obtain utility from the clean manufactured good ( )X , the dirty 
good ( )Y , the clean agricultural good ( )Z , a government-produced public good ( )G , 
and environmental quality ( )E . 
The household allocates a fixed amount of time ( )L  between taxable labor 
( )L  and non-taxable labor ( )ZL . For simplicity, I refer to the resource as time 
available for labor supply, but more generally, it can be a fixed total amount of all 
resources such as labor, capital, land, and energy. In that case, L  can be interpreted as 
the resources used in the market, where ZL  is the amount used for subsistence 
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agriculture. This reflects not only the conceptual problems in measuring agricultural 
income for taxation, but also administrative difficulties in monitoring and enforcement 
of that tax.11 Therefore, I assume that Z  is non-taxable.12 
The clean good is produced with a constant returns to scale production 
technology using only labor ( )XL , while a dirty good is produced with a constant 
returns to scale production technology using labor ( )YL  and emissions ( )D : 
 
 XX L=  (1.1) 
and ( ),  YY F L D=  (1.2) 
For convenience, a unit of X  is defined as the amount that can be produced 
using one unit of labor. The numeraire is labor (or equivalently, X ). 
The agricultural sector produces a non-taxable clean good ( )Z  with constant 
returns to scale technology using only labor as an input: 
 
 ZZ L= , (1.3) 
where a unit of Z  is defined as the amount that can be produced using one unit of 
labor. 
Both manufacturing outputs are assumed to be taxable. For environmental 
reasons, the output of the polluting sector ( )Y  might be taxed at a rate higher than that 
of the non-polluting sector ( )X . This chapter will focus on the differential, that is, the 
                                                 
11 The governments in many developing countries often have difficulties in finding suitable tax tools, 
especially when the transaction arises within the household or between households using informal 
markets. In this sense, a non-taxable clean agricultural good (Z) might be interpreted instead as all 
informal economic activities. See Schneider and Enste (2000) for an empirical assessment of the size of 
the underground economy for developing countries as well as OECD countries. 
12 It is well known that many countries exempt consumption taxes on foods and other agricultural 
products for the purpose of income distribution. 
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extra tax on the output of the dirty industry. In addition, note that any uniform tax on 
outputs X  and Y  is equivalent to a tax on labor used in those two sectors, since 
labor is the only source of income in this model. For these reasons, this model will use a 
tax on labor ( )Lt  to represent the uniform or common portion of the output taxes on 
X  and Y . Then, the output tax on a dirty consumption good ( )Yt  is the extra tax on 
output of the dirty industry. 
Emissions ( )D  are a dirty input that can be disposal of gaseous, liquid, and 
solid waste used to produce output. Note that the production function for Y  has 
variable pollution, D  per unit of output. This disposal is assumed to inflict some 
private cost on producers in terms of resources (labor), and a unit of emissions can be 
defined as the amount that requires one unit of resources:  
 
 DD L= . (1.4) 
Thus, the firm has constant private marginal cost of pollution, equal to one, so it 
chooses a finite amount of pollution. Because of the negative externality, however, the 
firm's choice is not socially optimal. Aggregate emissions ( )ND  have a harmful effect 
on overall environmental quality ( )E : 
 
 ( )E e ND= , (1.5) 
where  / 0e e D′ ≡ ∂ ∂ < . The model also assumes perfect competition, certainty, 
complete information, and perfect factor mobility between sectors. 
Government produces a public good using labor: 
 
 GG NL= . (1.6) 
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Government finances the public good with the tax on market labor ( )Lt  and the output 
tax on a dirty consumption good ( )Yt , and possibly a tax on emissions ( )Dt . Hence, 
the government budget constraint is  
 
 ( )L Y DG N t L t Y t D= + + . (1.7) 
For convenience, the consumer price for the polluting manufactured good ( )Yc  
is defined as the sum of the producer price ( )Yp  and the output tax ( )Yt . The nominal 
wage is normalized to one, and 1X Zp p= =  as well. Without loss of generality, 
assume that the initial producer price of Y  is normalized to one (i.e., 1Yp = ). 
Finally, the economy’s overall resource constraint is given by 
 
 ( )YNL NX N L D G= + + + . (1.8) 
A representative household maximizes the utility function, 
( ),  ,  ;  ,  U U X Y Z G E= , subject to the budget constraint, 
( ) ( )1 1L Yt L X t Y− = + + .  Taxable labor supply is given by 
X Y D GL L L L L= + + + . From the first-order conditions, we have  
( ) ( )1 1X Y Y Z LU U t U t λ= + = − = , where a subscript on U  denotes a marginal 
utility from that good ( ZU  is the partial derivative of  U  with respect to ZL ),  and  
λ   is the private marginal utility of income.13 
Using log-linearization techniques, appropriate for small changes, I derive 
equations that show the impacts of a tax change on prices, quantities, and welfare. 
                                                 
13  In the representative household’s utility maximization, it is assumed that she considers the 
environmental quality ( )E  and the public good ( )G  to be independent of her own choices.  This 
assumption is appropriate if the number of consumers ( )N  is large. 
 
 13
In general, I start at an initial competitive equilibrium with possible pre-existing 
Lt ,  Yt ,  and  Dt .  Special cases are considered where one or more of those taxes 
are not possible (i.e., are set to zero). The model then can be used to show all of the 
effects of a small increase in the emissions tax or if that is not possible, then a small 
increase in the output tax. In all cases, the revenue is returned through a reduction in the 
pre-existing tax on market labor so that  G   is not affected ( )0dG = . The effect of 
any such change on utility can be expressed by totally differentiating the household’s 
utility function: 
 
 X Y Z EdU U dX U dY U dL U Ne dD′= + − + . (1.9) 
Totally differentiate the overall resource constraint (1.8), divide it by  N ,  
and set  0dG = ,  to get: 
 
 YdX dL dL dD= − − . (1.10) 
Next, plug the first-order conditions from the utility maximization and (1.10) 
into (1.9), and divide it by the Lagrange multiplier ( )λ , to get:  
 
 ( ) ( )1 1Y LdU dX t dY t dL dDλ μ= + + − − − , (1.11) 
where  dU   is the change in a representative household’s utility.  The term  μ   
equals  ENU e λ′−   and denotes the MED from emissions. 




dY F dL F dD= + , (1.12) 
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where  ( )iF F i≡ ∂ ∂i   for   and Yi L D= . Then, substitute the first-order 
conditions from the profit maximization into (1.12) to get:14 
 
 ( )1Y DdY dL t dD= + + . (1.13) 

















⎛ ⎞⎟⎜+ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, (1.14) 
where a hat over a variable denotes a percentage change (e.g.,  L̂ dL L= ). The left 
hand side of this expression is the change in welfare in terms of a particular monetary 
unit ( )dU λ  as a fraction of the total return to market labor in the economy ( )L . The 
right hand side consists of three parts. The first and second parts are the welfare effects 
of the environmental policy through its impact on the amount of the market labor ( )L̂  
and the dirty manufactured good ( )Ŷ . The third term is the welfare impact resulting 
from the change in pollution ( )D̂ . Note that if either a tax on the market labor ( )Lt  or 
the extra consumption tax on the dirty good ( )Yt  is set to zero, then the corresponding 
welfare effect disappears from the equation. Also note that, even without any pre-
existing taxes ( )0L Yt t= =  in theory, the developing country can successfully 
internalize the externality by imposing a Pigouvian tax on emissions ( )Dt  equal to the 
MED ( )μ . The rate  Dt μ=   then maximizes utility ( )0dU = . 
                                                 
14 Maximizing the profit function,  ( ) ( ),  1Y Y DF L D L t DΠ = − − + ,  gives the first-order conditions:  
1
YL
F =   and  ( )1D DF t= + . 
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Next, totally differentiate the government budget constraint (1.7), divide it by 
the total amount of labor supply in the manufacturing sectors ( )NL ,  hold  G   
























⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1.15) 
 
where  ( )ˆ 1L L Lt dt t≡ − ,  ( )ˆ 1D D Dt dt t≡ + ,  and  ( )ˆ 1Y Y Yt dt t≡ + . This is the 
change in  Lt   necessary for government to balance the budget when changing  Yt   
or  Dt . To evaluate this expression, the next step is to solve for  L̂ ,  Ŷ ,  and  D̂   
in terms of two environmental tax instruments:  Ŷt   and  D̂t . 
In order to find analytical solutions to (1.14) and (1.15), one needs to make 
some assumptions on consumer preferences. In particular, assume that environmental 
quality ( )E  and the public good ( )G  are separable from the consumption goods 
( ),  ,  and X Y Z  and that the consumption goods enter utility in a homothetic sub-
utility function as in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) or Fullerton and Metcalf (2001): 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( ),  ,  ;  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  U X Y Z G E U V Q X Y Z G E= , (1.16) 
where  ( )V i   and  ( )Q i   are both homothetic.  For later use, define  Qp   as a 
price index on  ( ),  Q X Y   such that 
 
 Q X Yp Q p X c Y= +  (1.17) 
and let  w   be the real net wage,  ( )1 L Qw t p= − . 
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Totally differentiate (1.17) and divide it by  Qp   to get: 
 






















Since  1Xp =   always, the change in the overall price index ( )Q̂p  depends on the 
change in the producer price of a dirty good ( )Ŷp  and the change in its output tax 
( )Ŷt . 
For the change in the producer price of a dirty output ( )Ŷp , Appendix A.1 
shows how to use the zero-profit condition and the first-order conditions from profit 
maximization to obtain: 
 
 





= . (1.19) 





























This equation says that an increase in either  Yt   or Dt   results in an increase in the 
overall price index, and that the contribution of each depends on the expenditure shares 
of  Y   and  D   in after-tax labor income from the manufacturing sectors. 
The definition of the real wage rate implies that  ŵ = ˆ ˆL Qt p− − .  Thus: 
 






























This equation says that the real net wage decreases if any tax were to increase. Again, 
the contribution to the change in the real net wage depends on each expenditure share.  
































Subsistence agriculture ( )Z  is non-taxable and therefore operates in this model 
much like home production such as work in the household cooking, cleaning, child care, 
and gardening to grow food for the family. Therefore, the choice between market labor 
and home/agricultural labor acts in this model much like a labor-leisure choice in other 
models such as Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001).  
Thus, the next step is the derivation of a “labor supply” function, meaning the supply of 
labor to the market manufacturing sectors rather than to the non-market 
home/agricultural sector. 
Maximization of the household’s sub-utility for the composite manufactured 
good ( )Q  and a clean agricultural good ( )( ),  V Q Z  subject to the budget constraint 
( )Q wL=  gives the function for the supply of labor to the manufacturing sectors,  
( )L L w= ,  and totally differentiating it yields: 
 
 ˆ ˆL wε= , (1.23) 
where  ε   is the uncompensated elasticity of this labor supply in the manufacturing 
sectors with respect to the net wage (i.e.,  w L L wε ≡ ∂ ∂ ). 
The equations above can be used to solve for any change as a function of the 
exogenous tax change, exogenous parameters, and initial values of the variables.  
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Appendix B shows how these equations are used to solve for the key variables (D̂ , Ŷ ,  
and L̂ ). 
First, the change in emissions can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
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D t D L Y
t t t t
t Y Y L
σ φ ε
σ φ ε σ ε
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪− − +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= −Θ ⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤+ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥+ − − + + − + +⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (1.24) 
where ( ) ( )1 1Y Lt Y t Lφ ≡ + −  and 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1
1 1 L Y Dt t Y L t D Lε
−⎡ ⎤Θ ≡ − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.15 
Note that the  Qσ   part of  D̂t   term is similar to the  Ŷt   term. They 
represent the substitution in consumption. The  Yσ   part of  D̂t   term represents the 
substitution in inputs for production. 
For  Ŷ : 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
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Since both  D̂   and  Ŷ   are used in the key welfare equation (1.14), these 
two equations ((1.24) and (1.25)) deserve further discussion. First, note that both 
equations have the same term for an incremental tax change of the output tax (i.e., the  
Ŷt  term). It shows that if the developing country government increases (or introduces)  
tY  marginally and holds the level of the Pigouvian tax fixed (i.e., ˆ 0Dt = ), the effects 
on both the dirty input ( )D  and a dirty output ( )Y  are the same in magnitude (i.e.,  
Ŷ = D̂ ). Holding  ˆ 0Dt =   means that the government cannot (or need not) use the 
Pigouvian tax as an instrument for environmental improvement. This result just reflects 
the fact that the output tax change ( )Ŷt  will reduce output. No change in relative input 
prices ( )ˆ 0Dt =  means that both inputs will be reduced in the same proportion 
(Ŷ D̂= ŶL= ). 
Next consider the second terms in (1.24) and (1.25) that are multiplied by  D̂t .  
This change in relative input prices can affect  D   differently than  Y ,  but only 
when  Yσ   is not zero. With substitution in production, the firm can reduce pollution 
more than output ˆ(D ˆ)Y≠  and change pollution per unit of output, by an extent that 
increases with  Yσ . To clarify, note that if  0Yσ =   in (1.24) and (1.25), then  D̂t   
has the exact same effect on  D̂   as an  Ŷ . This corresponds to the special case 
where the dirty good itself generates externalities either in production or in 
consumption. Equivalently, suppose that pollution per unit of output is fixed. Then, the 
tax on a dirty output has the same effect on that output as it has on the dirty input. For 
example, final consumption goods such as gasoline and cigarettes may have 
                                                                                                                                               
15  One important assumption is that 0Θ > . Since ( ) ( )L Y DG NL t t Y L t D L= + +  from the 
government's budget constraint, this assumption means that the following condition needs to be satisfied:  
( )NL G Gε < − . 
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environmental problems that come not from one of the inputs to production, but from 
the use of the final consumption good, so the pollution per unit of output is fixed. 
Therefore,  Ŷ D̂= ,  so the government can achieve the same amount of reduction in 
pollution either by imposing an output tax or tax on pollution. In general, however, this 
model does allow for substitution ( )0Yσ ≠ . 
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⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥− +⎟ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= −Θ ⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥+ − + +⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (1.26) 
 
Since  0Θ> ,  0ε > ,  and all of the terms inside the large brackets are positive, an 
increase in either  Yt   or  Dt   does reduce labor use in the manufacturing sectors.  
This equation completes the solution for the necessary variables (D̂ , Ŷ , and L̂ ) to 
enter the key equation (1.14) for the change in welfare of the economy. 
If non-taxable production is clean as assumed, then environmental tax policy 
could generate further reductions in pollution levels through the indirect channel of 
reduced labor supply to taxable sectors. If instead subsistence agriculture is polluting, 
then environmental policy using tax instruments could cause an unwanted increase in 
the overall level of pollution. Moreover, the environmental problem could become 
worse, since pollution generated in the non-taxable sector cannot be regulated at all. 
This kind of dilemma arises when controlling inputs rather than emissions: if all inputs 
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cannot be regulated, partial application of sub-optimal input taxes might result in 
unwanted substitutions among inputs and therefore might aggravate the problem. 
However, it is unclear whether the sector  Z  is environmentally benign. In 
many developing countries, agricultural (or traditional) sectors have both 
characteristics: on the one hand, they usually employ environmentally-benign 
production technology such as less use of chemical fertilizer and tilling the soil with 
animals. In that case, environmental tax policy could achieve further reduction in the 
overall pollution level in the society by shifting labor to non-market activity. On the 
other hand, some developing countries like Brazil have been trying hard to reduce 
harmful farming activities such as slash-and-burn farming. In that case, the effect could 
be the opposite.16 
 
1.5 TAX REFORM AND OPTIMAL TAX RATES 
1.5.1 Tax Reform 
Suppose that the government of a developing country is considering a tax reform 
by raising (or introducing)  Yt   with pre-existing labor tax, holding  Dt   fixed (i.e.,  
0Lt > ,  0Dt ≥ ,  0Yt ≥   and  ˆ 0Yt >   but  ˆ 0Dt = ). Then, substituting (1.24), 
(1.25), and (1.26) into (1.14): 
 






⎡ ⎤= −Θ − − Α⎣ ⎦ , (1.27) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )1 1Y D L Lt Y L t D L t t D Lε μ⎡ ⎤Α ≡ + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
                                                 
16 Eskeland and Jimenez (1992) point out that small firms in the informal sector are often major polluters 
in developing countries. If I interpret Z  as the informal sector rather than as subsistence farming, then 
that increases the probability of an unwanted increase in the overall pollution level. 
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Note that this incremental tax reform has no substitution effect between inputs.  
Though  Yσ   is still nonzero, it is not relevant for  Ŷt . By imposing this additional 
output tax, the government can reduce the consumption level of a dirty good, but it 
cannot induce the producers to substitute other cleaner inputs for emissions in 
production. Therefore, the change in  Yt   has no substitution effect in production (i.e.,  









⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= − ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, (1.27a) 
Welfare is always increased by a small increase in the output tax from zero if  0Qσ > .  
However, as will be shown later, the magnitude of the net welfare effect from the output 
tax is smaller than that of the Pigouvian tax, due to the lack of a substitution effect. 
Next, suppose the government raises (or introduces)  Dt   with the pre-existing 
labor tax, holding  Yt   fixed (i.e.,  0Lt > ,  0Yt ≥ ,  0Dt ≥ ,  and  ˆ 0Dt >   but  
ˆ 0Yt = ). Then, the welfare expression (1.14) simplifies: 
 










L t Y Y
σ φ σ
λ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪+ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥ ⎟⎜= −Θ − − Α + Β⎨ ⎬⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪+⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
, (1.28) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 .Y L D L Lt Y L D L t t D L t t D Lμ ε μ⎡ ⎤Β ≡ + − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
The first term in the large brackets represents the output effect as before (i.e., the 
substitution in consumption from Qσ ). The second term is the substitution effect in 
production from Yσ : the producers can substitute one input for another as the relative 
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input prices change due to D̂t . In other words, a small increase in the  Dt   raises the 
consumer price for  Y   and the consumers moves away from  Y   to  X   (and 
possibly to  Z ) due to higher price. As a result, the environmental quality improves 
and the welfare rises. 
However, the output effect from  Dt   is smaller than the same effect from  
Yt .  Though similar to equation (1.27) in appearance, the first term in the large 
brackets (i.e., the  Qσ   term) of equation (1.28) has an additional multiplicative term,  
( ) ( )1 1D Yt D t Y+ +   in it.  This is the ratio of expenditure on the dirty input to the 
revenue from selling the output, and it is always less than one.  Thus, the output effect 
from  tD  is always smaller than the same effect from  Yt . 
The real strength of Dt , however, comes not from the output effect, but from 
the substitution effect. Unlike Ŷt  back in equation (1.27), the Pigouvian tax in (1.28) 
penalizes the use of D  and induces the producers of Y  to shift into more use of YL . 
This ability to abate emissions by input substitution is a very powerful way to improve 
the environment, and it thus increases the overall social welfare. As I will show later in 
the numerical simulation, the size of  Yσ   is very important to decide the size of 
welfare gain. However, many developing countries appear to have much lower  Yσ   
than in developed countries. For example, global coal use over the next two decades is 
expected to rise more than 50 percent, mostly in the developing world and especially in 
Asia.  In particular, industry accounts for two thirds of China’s coal use. Industrial 
boilers alone consume 30 percent of China’s coal. Despite the government’s large 
investments, these highly inefficient boilers are still widely used (WRI, 1998). Hence, 





1.5.2 Optimal Tax Rates 
Now I explicitly solve for the optimal tax rates for both  Yt   and  Dt   and 
briefly discuss their implications. 
First, the second-best optimal tax on emissions ( *Dt ) with pre-existing  Lt   can 











⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. (1.29) 
Note that  *Dt μ<   since  ( )( )1 1 1L Lt tε⎡ ⎤− − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  unless  0Lt =   or  0ε = ,  
which is consistent with Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994).  As Fullerton, et al (2001) 







where Goulder and Williams (1999) show that the partial equilibrium marginal cost of 
public funds  Ψ   is  ( )( )
1
1 1L Lt tε
−⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
With pre-existing Lt  and Yt , the second-best optimal tax rate on emissions 
( )**Dt  looks much more complicated. Before solving it explicitly, it can be shown that 
the second-best optimal tax rate on emissions still is less than the marginal 
environmental damages. Define  ( )( )**1 Dt D Yθ ≡ + , which is the pollution intensity 
of  Y   at  **Dt   from (1.29a).17  Rewrite equation (1.28) with  0dU =   to make 
a basic point: 
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 (1.30) 
Since the right-hand side of equation (1.30) is always negative, the second-best optimal 
Pigouvian tax with pre-existing  Lt   and  Yt   is less than the social marginal 
environmental damages ( )μ . 
The explicit analytical solution for  **Dt   is much more complicated, because 
the  **Dt   term appears in the both sides of equation (1.30).  However, a positive and 













ασ βσ ασ βσ γσ δσ κσ
γσ
− + + + − +
=  (1.31) 
where  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1L L Y L LD Y t D L t t Y L t t D Lα φ ε μ⎡ ⎤≡ − − + − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  
( )( )( )( )1 1L Y Yt D L t L Yβ ≡ − + ,  ( )( )( )( )1 1 LD Y t D Lγ φ≡ − − ,  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1L Y L LD Y t t Y L t t D Lδ φ ε μ⎡ ⎤≡ − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  and  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1Y Y Y L Lt L Y D L t Y L t tκ μ ε ε⎡ ⎤≡ + + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   for  
( ) ( )2 4 .Q Y Q Q Yασ βσ γσ δσ κσ+ ≥ +  
Note the difference between the second-best optimal Pigouvian tax ( )*Dt  with 
pre-existing labor tax from (1.29) and the second-best one with pre-existing labor and 
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emissions taxes ( )**Dt  from (1.31). The *Dt  only depends on the pre-existing  Lt ,  ε ,  
and  μ .  However,  **Dt   becomes much more difficult to calculate. It is required for 
the environmental authority to have information on technological and structural 
parameters. In developing countries, however, many administrative problems such as 
poor record keeping, unreliable and insufficient data, and shortage of trained officials 
are widespread. Thus, this heavy requirement for additional information would make it 
more difficult to implement emissions tax in developing countries. 
The second-best optimal tax on output ( )**Yt  with the pre-existing  Lt   and  
Dt , however, looks simpler. It can be obtained by setting the numerator of equation 
(1.28) to zero: 
 









⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎢ ⎥ ⎟⎜⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (1.32) 
Again, using the definition of the partial equilibrium marginal cost of public 
funds ( )Ψ , the equation (1.32) can then be rewritten: 
 




μ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎟ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎜= −⎟ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠Ψ
 (1.32a) 
Note that if  0Dt = ,  then equation (1.32a) collapses and  
** *
Y Yt t=   in the 
form: 
 








which is the output effect from the second-best output tax. If  Yt   is employed, the 
economy has two different sources of distortions: first, the output tax increases the 
consumer price ( )Yc  so that demand for  Y   decreases (if  0Qσ > ).  Second, the 
output tax raises the overall consumer price ( )Qp  so that the household reduces its 
demand for the composite consumption good ( )Q  and, if  0ε > ,  increases the non-
taxable agricultural good ( )Z . Since  Dt   has an output effect as well as the 
substitution effect, the second term in (1.32a) means that the tax rate  Yt   needs to be 
adjusted for the output effect already obtained from taxing emissions. Note that  
** 0Yt = ,  if  Dt μ= Ψ . In other words, if emissions are taxed optimally, then the tax 
rate on output should be zero.18 
Also note that if the optimal emissions tax  *Dt   is unavailable, and  0Dt = ,  
then equation (1.32b) says that the second-best optimal  Yt   is the desired emissions 
tax ( )*Dt  times emissions per unit of output ( )D Y . In other words, the second-best 
optimal  Yt   is equal to the social marginal environmental damage per unit of output.  
Fullerton, et al (2001) discuss the implication of the similarity between  *Yt   and  
*
Dt :  
if the ideal emissions tax is unavailable, then the output tax should be set to generate 
exactly the same output effect as the ideal emissions tax. 
An important policy implication of this result is that even if the authorities 
cannot tax emissions due to the difficulties of monitoring and enforcement or other 
administrative constraints, it does not mean that they have to over-tax the output. This 
point may be particularly relevant to many developing countries, since their monitoring 
and enforcement capabilities are less than in developed countries. They just need to 
                                                 
18 If  Dt   is set sub-optimally and fixed, while  Yt   can vary, then  Yt   should be raised by the 
additional desired output effect to cover for the under-taxation of emissions. 
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know the ratio of the dirty input to the output ( )D Y , which can be obtained by 
estimating the general input structures of polluting firms. Furthermore, if firms are 
similar to each other in terms of their production technology, it would be much easier 
for the environmental authorities to obtain this ratio without much burden. Many 
developing countries have manufacturing sectors that consist of relatively less diverse 
industries than in developed countries. Factories in the same industry also usually share 
relatively homogeneous and simple production technology. If so, the effort to improve 
environmental quality in developing countries becomes less burdensome. 
 
1.6 NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
In this section, equations (1.27) and (1.28) are used to measure the impact on 
welfare of a small change in either Dt  or Yt . This section employs parameter values 
from China, which in many respects has structural characteristics commonly found in 
many developing countries: a large agricultural sector, heavy dependence on indirect 
consumption taxes, widespread use of polluting inputs and out-dated technologies, and 
many geographically dispersed small point-source polluters such as Town and Village 
Enterprises. In the next subsection, various parameters are selected. 
It is important to remember that I use the parameter values from China as an 
example of developing countries. I do not claim that China be considered a prima facie 
representative developing country in every possible respect. No single country can be 
considered to have all the institutional and structural characteristics in many developing 
countries over the world. I only say that China has some institutional and structural 
characteristics relevant to the hypothesis presented in this chapter. The same reservation 
is explicitly made for for the U.S. used here as an example of developed countries. 
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1.6.1 Assumptions on Parameters 
To measure the impact on welfare of an incremental change in either  Yt   or  
Dt ,  equations (1.27) and (1.28) require values for many elasticities, shares, and initial 
tax rates. 
For  Lt ,  I want a tax rate that applies to the income from all household 
resources supplied to the market.  Although the top marginal personal income tax rate 
in China is 45 percent, the average taxpayer faces only a 15 percent marginal tax rate 
(Heritage Foundation, 2000).19 However, indirect consumption taxes such as the VAT, 
consumption tax, and excise taxes are usually applied to both clean and dirty 
manufacturing sectors in addition to the direct personal and enterprise income taxes.  
Currently, the VAT rate of 17 percent is applied to a large proportion of domestically-
produced goods and services as well as to imported goods.  However, the VAT is 
levied at a lower rate of 13 percent for the basic foodstuffs and agricultural goods.20  
Assuming that the VAT rate for foods and agricultural goods is the basic rate applied to 
every household regardless of economic activity, I safely choose 10 percent for the 
additional portion of tax burden from various indirect taxes.  Therefore, the final rate 
for  Lt   is  0.25. 
For  Yt ,  I need additional tax rate that applies only to the income from all 
market household resources engaged in polluting production activities ( )Y .  As 
mentioned above, the VAT is applied differently: the 17 percent rate applies to 
                                                 
19 This number can be justified by another calculation. China's GDP per capita was US $3,600 in 1998, 
which was about 30,000 yuan (IMF, 1999a and 1999b). Applying a standard deduction of 800 yuan per 
month, taxable income amounts to 24,000 yuan.  The tax rate for this income category is currently 15 
percent (Tseng, et al, 1994). 
20  It is reduced further for goods and services provided by small-scale taxpayers (6 percent).  
Furthermore, the business tax is applied at 3 to 5 percent to all enterprises, institutions, or individuals 
providing certain types of services, assign intangible assets, or sell immovable property within China, if 
their turnover is greater than a threshold specified by the Ministry of Finance (Tseng, et al, 1994). 
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produced goods in  Y ,  the 13 percent rate applies to in  X ,  and untaxed 
subsistence agriculture is part of  Z .  Therefore, the difference between  Y   and  
X   is 4 percent.  However, I will safely assume 5 percent for  Yt ,  because some 
excise taxes are levied at  3 to 8 percent on some goods such as motor vehicles (Ma, 
2000). 
For the uncompensated wage elasticity of market labor supply ( )ε , I need a 
single value to represent an aggregate of all workers in the manufacturing sectors and 
all market labor supply effects from changes in wages of the manufacturing sectors. In 
the case of developed countries, the literature provides many estimates of the hours 
elasticity that are small (or negative) for males, and other estimates that are large and 
positive for females. Although no specific estimates of uncompensated wage elasticities 
are available for China, numerous studies such as Rosenzweig (1980) and Jacoby 
(1993) show that the magnitudes are not much different from those in developed 
countries. In this model, however,  ε   represents elasticity of supply to the market 
sector rather than the non-market sector. So, I believe  0.3ε =   reasonable value.  I 
also vary these numbers for sensitivity analysis later. 
For  Y L ,  I calculate the proportion of the industries most responsible for 
pollution in total production. As of 1998 in China, almost 1.8 million collectively-
owned enterprises currently operate and often use obsolete production technologies and 
pollute more than other types of firms (World Bank, 1997). The 1998 data from 
National Bureau of Statistics (1999) shows that the polluting industries constitute 
slightly more than 50 percent of GDP, so I use 0.50 for  Y L .21  Since the magnitude 
of  φ   depends on the pre-existing  Lt   and  Yt   as well as  Y L ,  for 
                                                 
21 See Appendix A.3 for the list of polluting industries. 
 
 31
example, the choices for those parameters imply that  0.70φ =   for  0.25Lt =   
and  0.05Yt = .22  In other words, these polluting goods are primarily manufacturing 
goods, so 50 percent of total output represents almost 70 percent of private consumption 
of polluting manufactured goods. 
For  D Y ,  I want an aggregate share for pollution in the dirty output. In 
China, many households as well as private firms still use energy-inefficient coal-
burning boilers for heating. And the proportion of coal in total energy supply is 
estimated to drop less than 10 percentage point for the next 20 years (US DOE, 1999).  
Based on this evidence and the “final use” part of the 1997 input-output table from 
National Bureau of Statistics (1999), I calculate that the ratio of polluting inputs in total 
polluting output is about 55 percent.  So, I use  0.50D Y =   without giving false 
sense of precision. 
Estimates for the elasticities of substitution in consumption ( )Qσ  and 
production ( )Yσ  are not available for the specific aggregation in this model. For the 
case of developed countries, such as the U.S., Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) and 
Fullerton, et al (2001) assume that both elasticities are close to one, as is broadly 
consistent with the empirical literature on substitution in consumption and production. 
However, it might be too far-fetched to assume that the situation would be the same in 
developing countries: much anecdotal evidence indicates that those substitution 
elasticities may be much lower than in developed countries. Hence, considering these 
factors, the baseline simulation for China is assumed here to employ 0.50 for both  Qσ   
and Yσ . I also vary these numbers for sensitivity analysis later. 
                                                 
22 Recall that  φ   is defined as  ( ) ( )1 1Y Lt Y t L+ − . 
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Finally, the model requires a measure of MED ( )μ . Jha and Whalley (2001) 
review some estimates of environmental costs in selected Asian countries. In particular, 
they report that China has estimated environmental costs that are 5.5 to 9.8 percent of 
GDP (where measured GDP includes X  and Y  but not Z ). Unfortunately, this 
estimate is average damage rather than marginal damage. Moreover, their number is a 
more comprehensive measure than those from developed countries.23  Hence, for the 
case of developing countries, I use 5 percent of GDP for the estimate of damages. Then, 
since  Y   is assumed 50 percent of GDP, damages are about 10 percent of  Y .  
Moreover, since  D Y = 0.50,  damages would be about 0.2 per unit of  D  
(μ =0.20). 
Table 1.1 summarizes the assumed parameter values for numerical simulation.  
The first column shows the parameter values for developing countries. The second 
column shows a different set of parameter values. This case represents more or less the 
case for developed countries: social marginal environmental damages are lower 
( )0.1μ = , both substitution elasticities in consumption and production are higher 
( )1.0Q Yσ σ= = , marginal labor income tax rate is higher ( )0.4Lt = , the ratio of 
polluting goods to total output is lower ( )0.3Y L = , and the ratio of polluting inputs 
to polluting output is lower ( )0.4D Y = .24  I use this alternative set of parameter 
values to investigate how the size of net welfare gain from using emissions taxes is 
                                                 
23 Unlike the studies on the environmental damages in developed countries such as Pearce and Turner 
(1990) on the Netherlands or Freeman (1982) on the U.S., Jha and Whalley (2001) include not only 
health and productivity losses from pollution in urban areas (1.7-2.5 percent of GDP) but also 
productivity losses due to soil erosion, deforestation, and land degradation, water shortage and 
destruction of wetlands (3.8 to 7.3 percent) into the category. 
24 These parameter values for developed countries are similar to those used in Fullerton, et al (2001).  
The rationale for this alternative set of parameters can be found there. 
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changed due to various structural constraints. For a measure of welfare, I use  dU Lλ ,  
the monetary value in yuan of the change in utility as a fraction of market income. 
 








(e.g., the U.S.) 
μ : Social marginal 
environmental damage 0.20 0.10 
ε : Uncompensated elasticity of 
market labor supply 0.30 0.10 
Qσ : Substitution elasticity 
between outputs 0.50 1.00 
Yσ : Substitution elasticity 
between inputs 0.50 1.00 
Lt : Average marginal market 
labor income tax rate 0.25 0.40 
Yt : Average marginal output tax 
rate 0.05 0.00 
Dt : Average marginal emissions 
tax rate 0.00 0.00 
Y L : Ratio of polluting output to 
market labor 0.50 0.30 
D Y : Ratio of emissions to 
polluting output 0.50 0.40 
 
 
1.6.2 The Simulation Results 
Table 1.2 summarizes the simulation results.  The first column shows the 
developing country case (e.g., China).  The first-best Pigouvian tax on emissions 
would be  0.2μ = ,  but with a pre-existing tax on market labor ( )0.25Lt = , the 
marginal cost of public funds ( )Ψ  is  1.1111 , and the second-best tax on emissions 
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( )*Dt , is 18 percent from (29a).  Since the pre-existing  Yt   is 0.05, the second-best 
tax on emissions ( )**Dt  with pre-existing Lt  and Yt  is about 15 percent from (1.31).  
Furthermore, since  0.5D Y = ,  equation (32b) says that the second-best tax on 
output ( *Yt   with  0Dt = ) is 9 percent.  Note that  
* ** 0.09Y Yt t= =   because the 
pre-existing  Dt   is assumed to be zero. 
On the other hand, the second column shows the developed country case (e.g., 
the U.S.).  Since  0.1μ =   for this case, the first-best  Dt   would be  0.1.  The 
second-best tax on emissions ( )*Dt  is  9.3  percent, since 1.0714Ψ =  with a pre-




Table 1.2:  Simulation Results (in percent) 
 Developing Developed 
 Country Country 
 (e.g., China) (e.g., the U.S.)
Pre-existing tax rates   
Lt  25 40 
Yt  5 0 
Dt  0 0 
Second-best optimal tax rates   
 If  0Dt = , then  
*
Yt   should be 9.00 3.73 
   If  0Yt = , then  
*
Dt   should be 
   If  0Yt = .05, then  
**





Effect on emissions ( )D  from   
Ŷt  -0.15 -0.50 
D̂t  -0.33 -0.80 
Effect on the polluting good ( )Y  from   
Ŷt  -0.15 -0.50 
D̂t  -0.08 -0.20 
Welfare effects of   
Ŷt  0.0033 0.0060 
D̂t  0.0143 0.0096 
 
 
The simulation results confirm the theoretical prediction in that the effects on  
D   and  Y   from introducing a small  Dt   are greater than those from  Yt .  In 
particular, a marginal increase in  Dt   reduces  D   by  0.33  percent for a 
developing country, which is more than twice the size of the decrease in  D   from  
Yt .  For a developed country, the decrease in  D   is greater than in a developing 
country mainly due to the higher substitution elasticities in production as well as in 
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consumption.  Especially, emissions ( )D  decrease by  0.80  percent if a developed 
country introduces a small  Dt . 
The effects on the polluting good ( )Y  from a marginal increase of either  Yt   
or  Dt   are different from the effects on  D .  In particular, introduction of a small  
Yt   decreases  Y   by the exactly same magnitudes as it decreases  D   in both 
developing and developed countries.  However, the strength of  Dt   in reducing  Y   
is much weaker.  In both developing and developed countries, the magnitudes of 
reduction in  Y   from  Dt   amount to only a quarter of the magnitudes of reduction 
in  D .  This is because the change in relative input prices affects  D   differently 
than  Y ,  when  Yσ   is positive.  With substitution in production, the firm can 
reduce  D   more than  Y   and change pollution per unit of output, by an extent 
that increases with  Yσ .  Hence, for both developing and developed countries, the 
relative strength of  Dt   (compared to  Yt )  is smaller for reducing  D   and  Y . 
The welfare gain from introducing a small  Dt   is always greater than that 
from a small increase in  Yt .  Recall that the major strength of an emissions tax is that 
it provides both output and substitution effects, while the output tax only provides an 
output effect.  For the developed country case, the welfare gain from  D̂t   is about 
50 percent larger than the gain from  Ŷt .  For the developing country case, however, 
the relative strength of  D̂t   over  Ŷt   becomes larger:  0.0143  percent, which is 
more than four times greater than the gain (0.0033 percent) from  Ŷt . 
Another interesting point is that the welfare gain from  D̂t   is larger for a 
developing country than for a developed country.  For example,  D̂t   increases 
welfare by  0.0143  percent for a developing country but it is only  0.0096  percent 
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for a developed country.  This result is quite robust for the assumptions on some 
important parameters, as shown in the sensitivity analyses. 
One important policy implication from this result is that the potential welfare 
loss from not being able to use  Dt   could be bigger in developing countries.  The 
difference in the welfare gains between  Ŷt   and  D̂t   is  0.011  percentage points 
for the developing country case, while it is only  0.0036  percentage points for the 
developed country case.  Administrative difficulties in designing and implementing a 
perfect emissions tax are by no means easy tasks, even in developed countries.  The 
situations in many developing countries are worse: their institutional weaknesses such 
as under-funding and inexperience tend even further to limit the effective 
implementation of emissions taxes.  The simulation results imply that the potential 
welfare loss from using  Ŷt   instead of  D̂t   might be quite big especially in 
developing countries. 
At this point, it would be interesting to ask how the assumptions on parameters 
between developed countries and developing countries values affect the simulation 
results shown above. Table 1.3 shows the decomposition of the simulation results by 
parameter assumption. The first two columns show the base cases for developed as well 
as developing countries already shown in Table 1.2. The remaining columns show how 
the ‘developing countries case’ results would change as each single parameter value for 
the developing countries changes to that for the developed countries. 
The most striking point of Table 1.3 is that any change in a single parameter 
value for the case of developing countries can bring not so much reduction in emissions 
and the polluting good consumption by using either Yt  or Dt . All the numbers in the 
first four rows show that the reduction rates in  D   as well as  Y   from the uses of 
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Dt   and Yt   in the case for developing countries are about a half (and in many cases, 
one third) of those in the case for developed countries. For example, the change in the 
substitution elasticity between clean good and polluting good  to the level of 
developed countries ( )1Qσ =  only reduces D  by 0.3152 percent using Yt , which is 
the largest effect in D  for developing countries. This is only 60 percent level of the 
reduction in D  by using Yt  (0.50 percent) for developed countries. These results 
strengthens the implications drawn from the numerical simulation results in that any tax 
policies for the purpose of environmental improvement might be limited in their scopes 
and effects in developing countries without the simultaneous changes in other structural 
factors.. 
First, consider the third column that reports how the base simulation results for 
developing countries change if labor tax rate increases to the level assumed for 
developed countries ( )0.4Lt =  from that for developing countries ( )0.25Lt =  with 
other parameter values fixed at the base case for developing countries. With higher 
labor income tax at 40 percent, the developing country governments still can reduce 
emissions and the polluting good production by introducing (or raising) either 
consumption tax or emissions tax. As a result, welfare improves. However, note that the 
numbers reported in the third column are smaller than those in the second column (the 
base case for developing countries) in absolute value. It means that higher labor income 
tax rate makes disposable income smaller and causes larger labor supply distortion, 
generating less effective results in both reducing emissions and the polluting good 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The fourth column ( )0Yt = , the case that consumption tax rate is changed to 
zero, shows that the opposite results happen compared to the case of raising labor 
income tax rate. With no consumption tax, developing countries can have slightly 
stronger effects in reducing emissions and the polluting good consumption and in 
improving welfare by introducing (or raising) either consumption tax or emissions tax. 
It is because marginal positive change in consumption tax rate considerably decreases 
the polluting good consumption (-0.1667), which is almost three times bigger than the 
base case (-0.0670). Therefore, the size of welfare improvement from the use of 
consumption tax becomes much bigger in this case (0.0083) than the base case (0.0035). 
It also slightly increases the size of welfare improvement (from 0.0143 to 0.0167) from 
the introduction of emissions tax. 
The fifth column, which is the case that the MEDs become smaller ( )0.1μ = , 
shows that the effects of  Yt   as well as  Dt   on  D   and  Y   do not change 
from the base case for developing countries. With low level of MEDs and nonzero 
consumption tax rate (i.e., 0.1μ =  and 0.05Yt = ), additional increase of tax rates or 
introduction of new tax exacerbates the distortions in the economy, whereas the 
additional effects from environmental improvement from higher tax rates are negligible. 
Therefore, the welfare effects from the use of  Yt   becomes negative (-0.0004). In the 
case of  Dt ,  welfare increases only marginally (0.0061). 
In the case of lower elasticity of market labor supply ( )0.1ε = , which is 
reported at the sixth column, the effects on pollution reduction and welfare 
improvement slightly increase compared to the base case for developing countries. This 
is due to smaller labor distortion generated with environmental taxation. 
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Both the seventh and eighth columns show how the base case simulation results 
change if the subsditution elasticity between dirty and clean inputs ( )1Yσ =  as well as 
the one between polluting and clean goods ( )1Qσ =  become larger. Note that the 
higher input substitutability for the polluting good ( )Yσ  combined with the use of Dt  
can greatly reduce emissions (-0.5750), which is twice greater than the reduction rate 
for base case (-0.3250). On the other hand, the higher consumption goods 
substitutability ( )Qσ  combined with the use of Yt  can greatly reduce D   and  Y . 
The changes in welfare follow the same pattern: higher Yσ  with Dt  improves welfare 
twice greater than the base case, while higher Qσ  with Yt  shows twice bigger welfare 
change than the base case. 
The last two (ninth and tenth) columns in Table 1.3 show how the simulation 
results change when both the ratio of the polluting industries to GDP ( )0.3Y L =  and 
the ratio of the dirty input to the polluting good production ( )0.4D Y =  become 
lower. If Y L  becomes lower in developing countries, the change in emissions from 
the use of Yt  increases. With the consumption substitutability between clean and dirty 
goods fixed at the base case for developing countries (i.e., 0.5Qσ = ), smaller portion 
of dirty good industries in GDP increases the relative strength of tax intruments in 
reducing pollution. Since Yt  directly affects the consumption of Y  by increasing the 
consumer price of the polluting consumption good, the size of pollution reduction in D  
and Y  becomes most effective when combined with the use of Yt . The same 





1.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Some parameter values used in the numerical simulation are uncertain due to 
measurement problem.  Hence, I use some alternative values for the substitution 
elasticities ( ) and Q Yσ σ  and the elasticity of market labor supply ( )ε . 
 
Table 1.4: Sensitivity Analyses (in percent) 
Qσ    0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Developing Country (e.g. China) 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0000 0.0018 0.0035 0.0053 0.0070 0.0105 0.0140 
from D̂t   0.0126 0.0135 0.0143 0.0151 0.0160 0.0176 0.0193 
Developing Country (e.g. China) 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0000 0.0015 0.0030 0.0045 0.0060 0.0090 0.0120 
from D̂t   0.0072 0.0078 0.0084 0.0090 0.0096 0.0108 0.0120 
Yσ    0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Developing Country 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 
from D̂t   0.0017 0.0080 0.0143 0.0206 0.0270 0.0396 0.0523 
Developing Country 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 
from D̂t   0.0024 0.0042 0.0060 0.0078 0.0096 0.0132 0.0168 
ε    0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Developing Country 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0039 0.0036 0.0032 0.0027 0.0021 0.0000 -0.005 
from D̂t   0.0143 0.0143 0.0143 0.0142 0.0142 0.0140 0.0135 
Developing Country 
Welfare gain 
from Ŷt   0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 
from D̂t   0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 
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Table 1.4 above and Figures 1.1~1.3 below show how the size of the welfare 
gains depends on the assumptions on these parameter values. 
For  Qσ ,  the welfare gain from either  Ŷt   or  D̂t   increases for both 
developing and developed countries as the substitution ability between outputs 
increases.  However, the gap becomes smaller as  Qσ   increases.  For example, the 
welfare gains from  Ŷt   and  D̂t   are same with each other when  2.00Qσ =  for 
developed countries (See Figure 1.1).  This suggests that the welfare effects from the 
use of the environmental output taxes could be close to the welfare gain from an ideal 
Pigouvian tax if the substitution in consumption is large enough. For the welfare gain 
from  Ŷt   and  D̂t   to be same with each other for developing countries, the 
substitution in consumption would be very large. This suggests that, if the 
substitutability between consumption goods is not large in developing countries, the 
potential welfare loss from not being able to use an ideal Pigouvian tax (and instead 
using consumption tax instead) would be larger than developed countries. 
The welfare gain also increases as  Yσ   increases.  Moreover, the relative 
strength of  D̂t   over  Ŷt   becomes larger as  Yσ   increases.  For the extreme 
case, if  Yσ   is very small, then the welfare gain from the use of  D̂t   could be 
smaller than the welfare gain from  Ŷt .  However, the result that developing countries 
have larger potential welfare loss from not being able to use  Dt   are still valid (and 
even strengthened) as  Yσ   increases (See Figure 1.2). 
As the elasticity of market labor supply ( )ε  increases, the welfare effects 
slightly decrease for developing country.  This is because the household decreases 
market labor supply due to the decrease in real wage from a marginal increase in either  
Yt   or  Dt .  Note that the size of  ε  has no effects on welfare for the developed 
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country.  However, this is because the developed country has no pre-existing  Yt   or  
Dt .  In this case, the effects from the changes in  ε   are incidentally cancelled out 
from both numerator and denominator in welfare expression.  If  Yt   is non-zero, 
then the welfare effects follow more or less the same pattern as in the developing 
country (See Figure 1.3). 
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In this chapter, I use a simple general equilibrium model to examine how 
structural and institutional constraints might affect the relative performances of an ideal 
Pigouvian tax and an environmental output tax in developing countries. Although a 
Pigouvian tax has been shown theoretically to correct numerous environmental 
problems, many surveys reveal that most actual environmental taxes being used in 
many countries are applied to the output of a polluting industry (or to an input that is 
correlated with emissions). 
This chapter shows theoretically that a Pigouvian tax is superior to an output tax 
in welfare terms, because it provides the substitution effect among inputs as well as the 
output effect. However, the introduction of an ideal Pigouvian tax is usually not 
practical, due to administrative and informational problems. These problems are much 
more severe in developing countries. Furthermore, many developing countries suffer 
from other structural constraints such as high marginal environmental damages, large 
traditional (and often non-taxable) sectors, a larger proportion of polluting industries in 
total output, and many out-dated and polluting production technologies. Due to these 
additional constraints, developing countries might experience larger potential welfare 
disadvantages from not being able to use Pigouvian taxes. 
With a set of parameter values from China, which is believed to have many 
structural characteristics in common with developing countries, this chapter shows that 
the net welfare gain from the use of a Pigouvian tax could be four times larger than that 
of an output tax. Moreover, the potential welfare disadvantage from not being able to 
use an ideal Pigouvian tax is greater in developing countries than in developed 
countries. This result suggests that development of policy instruments that are more 
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accurately connected to polluting behavior is more urgent in developing countries. 
Furthermore, this potential welfare disadvantage implies that developing countries’ 
efforts in various structural reforms have important effects on the welfare outcomes of 
their environmental policies. Moreover, this welfare disadvantage does not imply that 
developing countries should avoid using environmental tax instruments. Although an 
introduction of an environmental output tax offers a smaller welfare gain in developing 
countries than in developed countries, the welfare gain from output tax instruments 
might be substantial, considering the potential savings from monitoring and 
enforcement activities. 
My results here concern welfare cost of having no Pigouvian tax. My model 
evaluates the output tax as a policy that can be implemented more easily than emissions 
tax. For actual environmental policy, however, governments might choose CAC policy 
instruments rather than output tax. When ideal tax is not available, countries use other 
CAC rules or non-market policies. And this tendency might be stronger in developing 
countries. Some forms of mandate such as a quantity restriction on pollution or certain 
equipment requirement might be chosen instead of emissions tax. My model in this 
chapter does not explicitly consider this point. Under competitive conditions, market-
based instruments usually perform better than CAC. In the presence of market 
imperfections, however, the effectiveness of the different policy instruments is 
ambiguous (Raquate, 2005). As shown by Fullerton and Metcalf (2001), the 
effectiveness of welfare improving environmental policy instruments comes not from its 
revenue-raising property: any policy instruments that generat privately-retained scarcity 
rents exacerbate the pre-existing labor tax distortion. In this sense, my model can be 
further modified to consider what structural and institutional characteristics in 
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developing countries are important in generating privately-held scarcity rents. In one 
hand, many developing countries suffer from not too transparent law-making as well as 
enforcement problems. For example, corruption tends to increase scarcity rents. On the 
other hand, any organized objections to delay adoption of market-based environmental 
policy instruments and to maintain scarcity rents might be weaker in developing 
countries. Formalization of these points into my model following Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2001) would be one of several possible extensions of my paper. 
Other research questions not examined in this chapter represent important 
directions for further study. First, this chapter considers a tax on output of the polluting 
(and taxable) industry, for comparison with the ideal Pigouvian tax. However, some of 
the actual environmental taxes apply to an input to production that is correlated with 
emissions. To analyze such a tax, the model in this chapter could be modified such that 
the polluting industry uses three inputs to production: labor, emissions, and some other 
input that is correlated with emissions. 
I also note that this chapter relies on many other standard simplifying 
assumptions such as a closed economy with perfect certainty and perfect competition, 
homogeneity among firms and households, and no trans-boundary pollution.  
Even though a closed economy model is an adequate representation of China, 
many developing countries are smaller and more open than China. On the other hand, 
one might vary the assumption of perfect competition, because the state and collectives 






Two Reasons to Subsidize Household Recycling: 




In recent years, environmental concerns about generation and disposal of waste 
have greatly increased. As of 2005, more than 245 million tons of municipal solid waste 
(MSW) was generated in the United States alone, which was 208 million tons in 1995 
(US EPA, 2002 and 2007). This means that each person generated an average of 4.5 
pounds of solid waste per day and the situation is not much different in other developed 
countries. In developing countries, each person presently generates less than 2 pounds 
of waste per day. Rapid urbanization along with economic development, however, 
suggests that their waste generation and disposal problems will become more serious in 
the near future (World Bank, 1999). 
Economic theory suggests that a regulator can achieve the social optimum by 
imposing a tax on waste-generating activity or by subsidizing its reduction (Pigou, 
1932). A direct application of this approach to the MSW problem is the per-unit charge, 
the practice of charging waste generators for each bag or container of trash. If the per-
unit charge on disposal is equal to the sum of the marginal private cost of waste 
collection and disposal plus any environmental externalities, and if it is perfectly 
enforceable, then the resulting level of MSW disposal will be optimal (Jenkins, 1993). 
However, it is practically impossible to tax the polluting activity directly because the 
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informational burden is stiff and, therefore, administrative and enforcement costs would 
be huge.25 Furthermore, these charges can make the environmental problems worse if 
the possibility of illegal disposal is real.26 In that case, introduction of unit-pricing 
policy might increase illegal dumping or burning (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; 
Sigman, 1995).27 Another important weakness of unit-pricing policy is that its price 
elasticity might be quite low.28  Even after the introduction of unit-pricing, the 
reduction of MSW tends to be small in many cases (Yoshida, 2002).29 
Without an enforceable Pigouvian tax or collection charge, many studies show 
that a combination of output tax and recycling subsidy, also known as a deposit-refund 
(D-R) system, can achieve the first-best outcome. For example, using a general 
equilibrium model, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) show that the optimal D-R system 
consists of an output tax combined with a subsidy for recycling, and for proper garbage 
disposal, with each rate set on the basis of the marginal social cost of disposal.30 In the 
process, recycling has drawn great attention from many researchers due to its roles in 
waste management.31 
                                                 
25 If the low-income households generate a large proportion of waste from less recyclable materials such 
as food residuals, compared to high-income households, the per-unit charge would be regressive in terms 
of income redistribution. This tendency might become worse if the waste pickup services as well as any 
recycling facilities were not well-organized in the low-income areas, since recycling efforts would be less 
effective. 
26 See US EPA (1998) about why illegal dumping is a problem. 
27 Choe and Fraser (1999) also show that the first-best optimal tax on waste cannot be achieved when 
household waste reduction effort is significant and possibility of illegal waste disposal exists. 
28 Several empirical studies have measured the price elasticity in various ways. Although the results are 
varied, many studies show quite low price elasticity. See, in particular, Choe and Fraser (1998). 
29 Note that it might have resulted from the low charge rates for MSW collection adopted by many 
municipalities. 
30 Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) confirm this result under more general settings. The “two-part 
instrument” is a generalized form of deposit-refund system that uses output taxes combined with 
subsidies to any kinds of pollution abatement activities such as substitution to cleaner inputs, legal 
disposal, and recycling. Walls and Palmer (2001) also show similar results using partial equilibrium 
models. 
31 For example, Fullerton and Wu (1998) explicitly introduce two product-design variables into their 
model: packaging per unit output and recyclability. They show that the social optimum can be achieved if 
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Previous studies, however, have mainly focused on a single aspect of recycling: 
households’ garbage reduction effort by recycling. Recycling is often assumed perfect 
in the sense that any recycled materials by households can be perfectly substitutable as 
an input for production. For example, both Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) and 
Fullerton and Wu (1998) implicitly assume recycling as a costless household activity of 
separating or decomposing consumption waste.32 
In this chapter, household recycling is not perfect. Household recycles usually 
need treatment or reprocessing to be used later for the production of consumption 
goods. For example, post-consumer recycling of plastics is complicated because it is 
often confusing to tell apart one type from another by sight or touch. Many households 
usually collect plastics without considering their exact types. Even a small amount of 
the wrong type of plastic can ruin the whole melt. Therefore, in my model, recycling 
per se is not final in reducing waste permanently; only the proportion properly 
reprocessed and used in successive stages of production contributes to reduction in 
waste. For example, any mixed plastics and wet newspapers are useless or too 
expensive to salvage for reprocessing firms. Therefore, I assume that only properly 
reprocessed recycles can be used in production, and I explicitly take account of this 
point by separating reprocessing from recycling. 
Second, previous literature also usually assumes that reprocessing is perfect. 
However, reprocessing costs private resources and, more often than not, generates 
waste. Reprocessing waste or pollution could be just any residuals unsuccessfully 
                                                                                                                                               
consumers are properly charged for their garbage disposal with a “downstream” tax on waste disposal.  
Even if a Pigouvian tax for disposal is not available, welfare can still be improved with proper 
“upstream” instruments such as a subsidy to recycling or to recyclability. Walls and Palmer (2001) 
similarly examine the role of an advance disposal fee in the context of life-cycle assessments.  As in 
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), both studies find that the first-best outcome can be achieved with various 
combinations of policy instruments in the context of possible market failures. 
32 Walls and Palmer (2001) also take the same approach. 
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reprocessed from household recyclables or might be generated due to the inherent 
technological limits in reprocessing. For example, waste oil (used motor oil from cars) 
can be reused after proper reprocessing treatment, but it would generate impurities that 
have to be disposed after reprocessing. Waste tires, after taken off cars, can be used as 
fuel because they have very high BTU. However, burning waste tires generate several 
toxic gases.  
Other studies have also identified these aspects but examined them differently 
from my model. In particular, Eichner and Pethig (2001) consider the case that 
producers can change material mix of a final good by product design. One of these 
materials is recyclable, and a greater recyclable share in the output makes it easier to 
recover and reuse the material. They acknowledge that recycling of material is 
necessarily incomplete. They allow for the possibility that this “waste material” is 
environmentally harmful after recycling, and that reprocessing is not completely 
substitutable. They focus their attention to the “material content” of products, which is a 
more limited form of product design. They do not distinguish two different kinds of 
imperfection between recycling and reprocessing, either. On the other hand, Calcott and 
Walls (2002) take into account the transaction costs associated with recycling markets. 
They model recyclability as an index that affects the cost of reprocessing household 
recycles. However, my model takes into account not only costly reprocessing but also 
externalities from reprocessing. 
Using a simple analytical general equilibrium model based on Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1995), I solve for the combinations of tax-subsidy instruments that achieve 
the first-best social optimum. I also examine what roles household recycling have in 
remedying the negative externalities from various sources, and how imperfection of 
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recycling and reprocessing built into the model affects the characteristics of a 
generalized optimal D-R system adopting the two-part instrument. 
If the first-best Pigouvian taxes are available, then the optimal corrective tax on 
each activity causing a negative externality is equal to its marginal environmental 
damages (MED). In this case, other output and input taxes are not necessary. And a 
subsidy for household recycling is also unnecessary because recycling improves (or 
harms) the environment only through successful reprocessing. Since the reprocessing 
externality is corrected by an existing Pigouvian tax, recycling is neither rewarded nor 
penalized. 
If illegal disposal or dumping cannot be properly taxed due to monitoring and 
enforcement problems, that is, if a Pigouvian tax on illegal disposal is not feasible, then 
a combination of a presumptive output tax and the corresponding subsidies for proper 
garbage disposal and for household recycling is optimal (a two-part instrument). In this 
case, a charge on garbage disposal should be lowered by the extent that proper disposal 
diverts illegal dumping. The important point is that a recycling subsidy is also needed 
because recycling also diverts illegal dumping to proper disposal. This is the first reason 
to subsizie household recycling and it is first successfully derived in Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1996). 
My contribution is to add another (second) reason to subsidize household 
recycling by considering the imperfection in recycling as well as in reprocessing. If no 
Pigouvian tax is available on the waste from imperfect reprocessing, then the role of 
recycling becomes more important.  Now recycling receives a subsidy for two 
different reasons: the first from the role that diverts illegal disposal as noted earlier. The 
second part of a recycling subsidy comes from the imperfection assumption regarding 
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reprocessing. In the absence of a Pigouvian tax on reprocessing waste, an additional 
“two-part instrument” should be implemented. In this case, it consists of a presumptive 
output tax on reprocessed material and the subsidies for labor and for household 
recycling. Again, this imperfection factor in recycling does not change the importance 
of a recycling subsidy: it can be handled by a charge for proper garbage disposal. But 
the fact that reprocessing is imperfect can only be handled by a subsidy for recycling 
when a first-best Pigouvian tax on waste from reprocessing is not available. 
Before presenting the model in the next section, it would be helpful to clarify 
my two terminologies: imperfect recycling and imperfect reprocessing. By ‘imperfect 
recycling,’ I mean that the recycling activities by households are partial. It could be so 
because households do not always know how to correctly recycle many different 
materials. By ‘imperfect reprocessing,’ I mean that the reprocessing technology is not 
perfect. 
In the following Section 2.2, I introduce the model. In Section 2.3, I derive the 
outcome in the social planning model as well as the decentralized market outcome. 
Then, I compare the decentralized outcome with the social planner’s and derive the 
first-best optimal tax-subsidy schemes, first assuming that a Pigouvian tax on the use of 
reprocessed materials is available and then relaxing that assumption. Finally, Section 
2.4 is for conclusion and further discussion. 
 
2.2 THE MODEL 
My model is a simple general equilibrium model. It is also a first-best model, 
since it does not incorporate any other distorting taxes on labor supply or capital. I use 
lower case letters to denote values per household and upper case letters for aggregates.  
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I consider a single jurisdiction with  n   identical households. Each buys a single 
composite consumption good  c ,  and each disposes of solid waste in three forms: 
proper garbage collection  g ,  potentially recyclable materials  r ,  or illicit 
burning or dumping  b . These alternatives are substitutes in the technology of 
household of disposal options. 
 
 ( ),   ,   c d g r b= , (2.1) 
where  ( )d i   is continuous and quasi-concave, with first derivatives  0gd > ,  
0rd > ,  and  0bd > . That is, all three kinds of disposal by households can increase 
the quantity of consumption  c . This relationship also depicts how the household is 
able to shift among disposal methods. With a given amount of consumption, the 
household may be able to reduce  g   and/or increase  r   by engaging in various 
activities such as collecting plastic and newspapers and/or increase  b   by burning 
garbage in her backyard or dumping them in public places. Therefore, Eq. (2.1) relates 
all the different combinations of g , r , and b  that are consistent with any given level 
of consumption (like an isoquant). 
The household has a fixed total of resources k  (which can be labor, capital, or 
both). Though these illegal activities do not incur any costs in terms of market price, 
they are assumed to use private resources ( )bk bβ= . The marginal costs of burning 
are assumed positive ( )0bβ >  and rising ( )0bbβ > . 
In the household garbage collection industry, firms use resources,  gk ,  as the 
only input with a linear production technology: 
 
 gg kγ= . (2.2) 
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Firms extracting virgin materials produce  v ,  use resources  vk ,  and 
generate pollution  vw   with a constant returns to scale technology: 
 
 ( ),  v vv v k w= , (2.3) 
with both first derivatives  kvv   and  wvv   positive. Thus, firms have to use more 
input materials and/or allow more pollution to produce more virgin materials. 
Reprocessing firms collect potentially recyclable materials  r   from 
households, reprocess it into reprocessed material  m ,  and supply  m   to the 
producers of the consumption good. In doing so, they use resources  mk   and generate 
reprocessing waste  mw : 
 
 ( ),   ,   m mm m k r w= , (2.4) 
with all the first derivatives  kmm ,  rm ,  and  wmm   positive. Note that, like firms 
in extracting virgin materials, reprocessing firms can increase output if they increase 
pollution from reprocessing ( mw ) or any other input. Previous literature usually 
assumes that household recycling is complete and final, so that any recycled materials 
can be used as inputs for production without further waste. However, recycled materials 
by households usually require treatment or reprocessing to be used later for the 
production of consumption goods. 
The consumption good  c   is produced using a constant returns to scale 
production function 
 
 ( ),   ,   cc f k v m= , (2.5) 
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with input of resources  ck ,  virgin materials  v ,  and reprocessed materials  m .33 
Since all production functions are constant returns to scale, the scale of the firm is 
irrelevant. Thus, I can assume that each symbol above represents an amount per capita. 
Utility of each individual depends positively on the amount of consumption 
good purchased in the market ( )c  and leisure use of time and resources ( )ll k= .  It 
depends negatively on the total amount of garbage generated by households ( )G ng≡ , 
the total amount of pollution generated in the production of virgin material 
( )v vW nw≡ , and the aggregate pollution generated in the production of reprocessed 
material ( )m mW nw≡ .34  Utility also depends on the aggregate pollution generated 
by illegal burning or dumping ( )B nb≡ . These four negative externalities could 
require four Pigouvian taxes. If any one such Pigouvian tax is not available, it can be 
replaced by a two-part instrument. Some of those two-part instruments might imply a 
subsidy to recycling, and some might not. 
The utility function is 
 
 ( ), , , ,  ,v mu u c l G B W W= , (2.6) 
where the first derivatives are  0cu > ,  0lu > ,  0Gu < ,  0Bu < ,  0Wvu <   
and  0Wmu < . I also assume that the MED from illegal disposal or dumping exceeds 
that from proper disposal ( )G Bu u> . 35  This assumption seems innocuous: for 
                                                 
33 Note that the above production function (2.5) is general with respect to the relation between  v   and  
m . For example, this production function includes a special case where virgin and reprocessed recycled 
materials are homogeneous in quality and, therefore, can be used as a perfect substitute for each other:  
( ),   
c
c f k v m= + . 
34 Extraction of virgin materials may reduce the utility of others. For example, cutting timber may reduce 
the enjoyment of natural areas and possibly aggravate global warming (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995). 
35 For example, The Economist (1993) reports that the costs incurred by illegal burning or dumping are 
significantly greater than the costs of proper landfilling. 
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example, the contamination of the water supply polluted by waste dumped in unsafe pits 
and the air pollution caused by illegal burning aggravate the social health and clean-up 
problems, more-so than proper disposal of garbage in a landfill (Ferrara, 2003). 
 Note that the utility function has four different types of waste that all affect 
utility differently. Hence, my model is more general than having only one waste 
externality in utility. This feature is useful to show what happens in the special cases 
where all add to the same externality. Also, the different types of externalities from 
waste help clarify what happens in my results with optimal taxes and subsidies. This 
point will be discussed with the analytical results later. 
Finally, the model is closed by the overall resource constraint: 
 
 c l g b m vk k k k k k k= + + + + + . (2.7) 
 
2.2.1 Outcome in the social planner’s problem 
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative household in (2.6) 
subject to the social planner’s constraint (2.5) that is reformularized with the resource 
constraint and production functions (2.1) and (2.7). The resource and production 
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with respect to  r ,  b ,  gk ,  lk ,  vk ,  mk ,  vw ,  and  mw . I assume that a 
unique and internal solution exists. The first-order conditions are 
 
 kcc g G g
f
u d u n dδ
γ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜+ = + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (2.8a) 
 ( )c r r m ru d d f mδ= − , (2.8b) 
 ( )c b B kc b bu d u n f dδ β+ = + , (2.8c) 
 l kcu fδ= , (2.8d) 
 Wm m wmu n f mδ= − , (2.8e) 
 Wv v wvu f vδ=− , (2.8f) 
 kc m kmf f m= , (2.8g) 
and kc v kvf f v= , (2.8h) 
where  δ   denotes the social marginal utility of income,  kcf   is the marginal 
product of  k   used in the production of consumption good (c ),  mf   is the 
marginal product of reprocessed materials (m ),  vf  indicates the marginal products of 
virgin materials ( v ), and  kmm   is the marginal product of  mk   used in 
reprocessing. 
Equations (2.8a~2.8h) state that each input should be employed up to the point 
where its marginal social benefit equals its marginal social cost. In (2.8a), for instance, 
the dollar value of utility from consumption made possible by a unit of garbage 
c gu d
δ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 is reduced by the utility cost of the garbage externality ( )Gu n δ  before 
comparison with the production cost of garbage. 
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2.2.2 Outcome in the decentralized model 
For the case of private markets, individuals maximize utility in (2.6) subject to a 
budget constraint that may be affected by a tax or subsidy on each good, 
 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,  ,  ,
k l r r
c g g b
p k k b p t r
t d g r b p t g t b
β− − + −
= + ⋅ + + + ⋅
 (2.9) 
where  kp   is the price earned on resources, the price of consumption good equals one 
( )1cp =  since  c   is numeraire,  ct   is the tax per unit of consumption,  gp   is 
the price paid by households for garbage collection,  gt   is the tax per unit of garbage,  
rp   is the price for recyclables paid by the reprocessing firms to the households (which 
could be positive or negative),  rt   is the tax on (or subsidy for) the household per 
unit of potentially recyclable materials collected by the household, and  bt   is an ideal 
Pigouvian tax on illegal disposal.36 Note that the private cost of illegal disposal,  
( )kp bβ , is included in the budget constraint. 
Consumption goods producers receive a price ( )1cp =  for selling  c   and 
pay for inputs  ck ,  v ,  and  m . Their profits are expressed as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),  ,  c c k kc c v v m mf k v m p t k p t v p t mπ = − + − + − + , 
where  kct   is the tax on the resources ( )ck  used in production of consumption good,  
vp   is the price paid for virgin materials,  vt   is the tax per unit of virgin materials,  
mp   is the price of reprocessed materials, and  mt   is the tax per unit of household 
                                                 
36 A tax on illegal disposal ( )
b
t  is included in (2.9) for the standard case of the first-best Pigouvian 
taxes. It can be set to zero for more realistic cases. 
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recycling. Under perfect competition with constant returns to scale, maximization of  
cπ   gives 
 
 kc k kcf p t= + , (2.10a) 
 v v vf p t= + , (2.10b) 
and m m mf p t= + . (2.10c) 
Producers of household garbage collection services similarly maximize their 








= . (2.11) 
For reprocessing firms, the following profit function is maximized:  
( ) ( ),  ,  m m r m k km m r wm mp m k m w p t k p r t wπ = ⋅ − + − − . Using (2.10a) and (2.10c), 
the first-order conditions can be simplified as follows: 
 
 ( )m m km kc kc kmf t m f t t− = − + , (2.12a) 
 ( )m m r rf t m p− = , (2.12b) 
and ( )m m wm wmf t m t− = . (2.12c) 
Finally, producers of virgin materials maximize 





 ( )v v kv kc kc kvf t v f t t− = − +  (2.13a) 
and ( )v v wv wvf t v t− = . (2.13b) 
In this decentralized economy, the consumer chooses  g ,  r ,  b ,  and  l   
to maximize utility in (2.6) subject to the budget constraint in (2.9). The resulting four 
first-order conditions involve prices  ( kp ,  gp ,  and  rp ),  but I replace those with 
marginal products from (2.10a), (2.11), and (2.12b) to get (2.14a~2.14d). The 
consumer’s lagrangian multiplier  μ   denotes the private marginal utility of income. 
Four other conditions for the decentralized equilibrium (2.14e~2.14h) come from 
various profit maximizations. 
 
 ( )1 kc kcc g c g g
f t
u d t d tμ
γ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= + + +
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (2.14a) 
 ( ) ( )1c r c r r m m ru d t d t f t mμ ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦ , (2.14b) 
 ( ) ( )1c b c b kc kc b bu d t d f t tμ β⎡ ⎤= + + − +⎣ ⎦ , (2.14c) 
 ( )l kc kcu f tμ= − , (2.14d) 
 ( )wm m m wmt f t m= − , (2.14e) 
 ( )wv v v wvt f t v= − , (2.14f) 
 ( )kc kc km m m kmf t t f t m− + = − , (2.14g) 
and ( )kc kc kv v v kvf t t f t v− + = − . (2.14h) 
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Now I can find the optimal tax and subsidy rates in equations (2.14) that make 
those market conditions in (2.14) match up perfectly with the social planner’s 
conditions in (2.8). 
 
2.3 OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR THE FIRST-BEST OUTCOMES 
2.3.1 When the first-best Pigouvian taxes are available. 
If the market does achieve the optimum, then δ μ=  from (2.8d) and (2.14d). 
By comparison of (2.8) and (2.14), if  * *c mt t=
* *
v rt t= =
* *
kc kmt t= =





















= − . 
This is the standard result from the general principle of Pigou (1932): the 
optimal corrective tax on an activity causing a negative externality is equal to its MED. 
Therefore, any output or input taxes become unnecessary if the first-best Pigouvian 
taxes are available. Note that the tax on household recycling ( )*rt  is zero. Household 
recycling itself has no external effect. It improves (or harms) the environment only 
through reprocessing. Since any waste generated by reprocessing firms is already taxed 
( )0wmt >  according to its damage to the environment, household recycling is neither 
rewarded nor penalized. 
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Note that the first-best optimal taxes on virgin waste ( )vW  and on reprocessing 
waste ( )mW  can be collapsed into a single optimal tax on waste ( )wt , if there is no 
difference between household recycling and reprocessing.  
Can the environmental authority estimate the necessary quantity restrictions 
from these results and implement the command and control policies such as mandatory 
recycling for households and/or minimum recycled-content standards on producers in 
order to achieve socially efficient outcomes? At least in theory, it appears to be 
possible. As Palmer and Walls (1997) show, however, such standards by themselves 
can achieve the social optimum only when combined with additional taxes on both the 
final product and other inputs. Furthermore, the information burden required to achieve 
those efficient outcomes would be huge, and so this information is not likely to be 
available to policymakers. 
It is not certain if illegal disposal increases after introducing a tax on garbage 
pickup services. On one hand, some studies report that this was indeed the case, 
especially in the densely populated urban areas of the city.37 On the other hand, there 
exist other studies that report the contrary.38 Even if illegal disposal was initially 
caused by the imposition of a price on garbage, it might not long remain a serious 
problem (OECD, 2004). 
 
2.3.2 When illegal disposal cannot be taxed 
The first-best Pigouvian taxes on disposal derived in the previous subsection 
2.3.1 is generally considered to be impractical. In particular, a simple Pigouvian tax on 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Reschovsky and Stone (1994) and Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996). 
38 See, for example, Miranda and LaPalme (1997) and Nestor and Podolsky (1998). 
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illegal burning or dumping ( )*bt  is difficult, if not impossible, to implement due to 
monitoring and enforcement problems. If  *bt   is not available, then the social 
optimum can still be achieved by using a combination of a presumptive tax on 
consumption and a subsidy for proper disposal activities (g  and r ) as follows. If  
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d dμ μ
= − + , 















= − . 
Since  0Bu < , the presumptive consumption tax ( )**ct  is positive and it 




− . Garbage is taxed for its detrimental 
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⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ < ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 to avert illegal disposal. This result clearly shows that if 
the corresponding first-best Pigouvian tax is not available due to various difficulties, a 




It is evident that the disposal fee is less than the Pigouvian charge derived in the 




⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. It is 
not easy to determine, however, how much  **gt   would be lower than  
*
gt .  If the 
MED from illegal disposal is large enough, then the optimal charge for garbage pickup 
might approach zero or, in extreme case, turns out negative. The ultimate level and/or 
sign of  **gt   also depends on the relative easiness of illegal burning to proper garbage 
collection ( bd  and gd ).39 If proper garbage pickup systems are not readily available 
(i.e., high gd ) or unsafe garbage disposal is wide-spread (i.e., low bd ) as in many 
developing countries, free garbage pickup services may be more effective in improving 
environmental welfare.40  
Note that the tax on household recycling ( )**rt  is negative (i.e., a subsidy).  In 
the previous subsection,  * 0rt =  since recycling was not held responsible for being 
either detrimental or beneficial to the environment and the environmental authority 




wmt ,  and  
*
wvt ). In the absence of any  bt ,  however, household recycling contributes to proper 
waste disposal by diverting illegal burning or dumping. Therefore, household recycling 
is subsidized to the extent of its contribution. 
Also note that the optimal tax on waste from extracting virgin material ( )**wvt  is 
exactly equal to the MED caused by this activity: it is not used to encourage recycling 
or to discourage the generation of waste. Therefore, the environmental authority should 
not attempt to use this upstream tax to solve the externalities from downstream activity. 
                                                 
39 Consider the “material balance” case: d g r b= + + . Since 1
r b
d d= =  in this case, the optimal 
tax and subsidy rates in (2.16) show that garbage receives a net subsidy (because it is assumed that  
B G
u u< ). 
40 This case would be also relevant in some developed countries that have vast and less-populated areas 
like Australia (Choe and Fraser, 1998).  
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These results are well-established by the previous studies including Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1995) and Walls and Palmer (2001). 
My model shows that the same logic can be applied to the case of a Pigouvian 
tax on reprocessing waste. The optimal tax on waste or pollution generated from 
reprocessing ( )**wmt  is also exactly equal to the MED caused by reprocessing: it is not 
used to remedy the imperfection of household recycling or to discourage illegal 
dumping. This result implies that the environmental authority should not be confused 
between two different kinds of imperfection between household recycling and 
reprocessing. Household recycling should be subsidized exactly to the extent that it 
diverts potential illegal dumping. It should not be penalized based on any presumptive 
mistakes that households might cause such as placing recyclables into garbage 
containers. Any household recyclables sent to landfill sites due to incomplete recycling 
can be charged with  **gt . 
 
2.3.3 When no Pigouvian taxes are available 
In practical viewpoint, it is not much easier to implement the first-best 
Pigouvian taxes on both reprocessing waste ( )wmt  and virgin material extraction 
externality ( )wvt  than a tax on illegal dumping or burning ( )bt . It would be difficult to 
monitor pollutants accurately and to enforce the optimal charges. Although this chapter 
primarily focuses on the optimal MSW policies, any efforts to reduce MSW are 
intrinsically related to other forms of pollutants such as airborne particles and sewage. 
These factors dramatically increase the difficulties in gathering any necessary 
information to calculate the optimal rates of Pigouvian taxes and in enforcing them. 
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Even if no Pigouvian taxes are available, however, the environmental authority 
still can find the appropriate first-best tax-subsidy scheme to achieve the optimum, as 
follows. If  *** *** *** *** 0b wm wv kct t t t= = = = , then the social planner’s first-best FOC can 
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The different waste externalities that I use in my model (i.e., 
,  ,  ,  ,  v mG B V W W ) help clarify what happens in the above resuts. For example, every 
term with BU  can be grouped conceptually, because they all are used in combination 
to correct for the fact that government cannot tax illegal burning or dumping. Similarly, 
every term with GU  can be grouped conceptually because they arll are used in 
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combination to correct for the case that government cannot tax proper disposal of 
household garbage. For example, three tax rates in (2.17) have a term with WmU  for 
waste in materials reprocessing. The production function is ( ),   ,   m mm m k r W= . If 
government cannot tax mW , then the equivalent is to tax output m , and subsidize both 
other inputs mk  and r . 
The optimal level of a presumptive consumption tax ( )***ct  does not change 
from the one obtained in the previous subsection ( )**ct . It is positive and reflects the 
MED from illegal disposal. Garbage is again taxed for its detrimental effects on the 
environment but this proper disposal is subsidized to avert illegal disposal.  However, 
an output tax on reprocessed material ( )*** 0mt >  is needed to handle the externality 
from reprocessing waste ( )mw . In this case,  
***
mt   should be combined with a subsidy 
for the clean input ( )*** 0kmt <  to undertake the same role of the first-best Pigouvian tax 
on reprocessing waste ( )**wmt  in the previous subsection. This is exactly the same logic 
of the “two-part instrument” that replaces the Pigouvian tax on illegal burning ( )***bt  
with a combination of the presumptive consumption tax and a recycling subsidy. 
Reprocessing firms are assumed to be polluting and therefore pay tax  ***mt   in 
advance, but this effectively means that all inputs employed in the reprocessing industry 
also have to pay taxes even though not all of these inputs are polluting. Hence, in this 
case, the clean input  mk   receives a subsidy ( )*** 0kmt < . The same logic also applies 
to the case of virgin material. Producers of virgin material pay a presumptive output tax 
( )*** 0vt > , but a part of this output tax is returned to the clean input as a subsidy 
( )*** 0kvt < . These two parts together make up for the absence of a Pigouvian tax on 
waste from reprocessing ( )wrt . 
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Also, note that the absence of  wmt   can be replaced by the combination of a 
tax on  m   ( )*** 0mt >  and subsidy to clean inputs  ***( 0rt <   and  *** 0)kmt < . Now 
the subsidy for household recycling ( )*** 0rt <  has an additional term 
( )Wm r wm
u nm
mμ  unlike the previous  
*
rt   and  
**
rt . This additional term shows how 
the characteristics of reprocessing affect the subsidy structure for household recycling. 
The first role is that recycling can divert illegal dumping, as already shown in the 
previous subsection. The second and new role is that recycling serves as a clean input 
for the reprocessing industry and therefore should receive a portion of the presumptive 
output tax on reprocessed material as another clean input  mk   does. 
Since marginal products of both reprocessing waste and recycling ( wmm  and 
rm ) are positive, the second term of  
***
rt  is negative. Therefore, 
*** ** 0r rt t< < . This 
means that a subsidy for recycling when reprocessing is imperfect should be bigger than 
the subsidy for recycling when reprocessing is perfect and generates no waste. 
Therefore, the roles of the recycling subsidy are strengthened when the first-best 
Pigouvian taxes cannot be used. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
In recent years, environmental concerns about generation and disposal of MSW 
have greatly increased in both developed and developing countries. Economic theory 
suggests that the social optimum can be achieved by imposing a tax on waste-
generating activity or by subsidizing its reduction. The per-unit charge on household 
garbage has been proposed to implement this approach and accepted by many 
municipalities, even though the informational burden is heavy and often the actual rates 
of the per-unit charge are believed to deviate from the optimal ones. Furthermore, these 
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charges can make the environmental problems worse if the possibility of illegal disposal 
is present. Therefore, a D-R system has recently been in the center of discussion. In 
general, a presumptive output tax combined with subsidies for recycling and proper 
garbage disposal can achieve the social optimum in the presence of illegal disposal. 
Previous studies, however, have assumed that recycling is perfect in the sense that any 
recycled materials by households can be substitutable for virgin material without 
reprocessing. Furthermore, reprocessing is also usually assumed perfect in the sense 
that no reprocessing waste or pollution is generated during the process. 
In this chapter, neither recycling nor reprocessing is assumed perfect. Using a 
simple general equilibrium model, I examine how the tax-subsidy structure should 
change as the first-best Pigouvian taxes become unavailable. 
When illegal disposal or dumping cannot be properly taxed, a positive output tax 
combined with the corresponding subsidies for proper garbage disposal and household 
recycling still can achieve the social optimum. When no other Pigouvian taxes are 
available either, then the optimal tax rates on consumption and garbage disposal are not 
different from those derived earlier. New presumptive taxes on reprocessed and virgin 
materials should be introduced and any clean inputs are subsidized. The subsidy for 
recycling now consists of two parts. The first part represents the role of recycling that 
diverts illegal disposal. On the other hand, the second part rewards the role of household 
recycling as a clean input for reprocessing. In the context of previous literature, these 
results confirm that a generalized D-R system proves effective in remedying various 
externalities without depending on the use of Pigouvian taxes. This suggests that the 
roles of household recycling are crucial in solving the externality problems even in the 
case that the environmental authority cannot freely choose all policy instruments. The 
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authority can achieve the social optimum by increasing the magnitude of a recycling 
subsidy accordingly as the possibility of using the Pigouvian taxes become harder. 
Is it possible to implement any other tax-subsidy schemes without relying on the 
use of a recycling subsidy? The answer would depend on whether the environmental 
authority has any other policy instruments to use following the simple logic of the “two-
part instrument.” For example, assuming substitutability between household recycling 
and virgin material as well as no externalities from reprocessing, the authority can still 
achieve optimum by subsidizing another clean input if a subsidy for recycling is not 
available as shown in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995). However, if recycling is 
imperfect and reprocessing generates waste as modeled here, then a subsidy for 
recycling becomes an indispensable instrument since the household recycling enters 
into both the household’s consumption function and into reprocessing firms’ production 
function.  
These results appear to be quite robust with respect to various model 
specifications and market conditions. For example, Ferrara (2003) shows that a 
combination of presumptive consumption taxes and legal disposal and recycling 
subsidies is still needed to achieve social optimum even when both the waste stock 
externality and the households’ heterogeneous preferences for garbage pickup 
frequencies are considered.41 Considering the “transaction costs” problem associated 
with any large-scale recycling programs, Shinkuma (2003) finds that a D-R system is 
one of the three promising alternative policy schemes.42 Similarly, Calcott and Walls 
(2002) find that the most encouraging policy is a modest disposal fee which is less than 
                                                 
41 In addition to a uniform consumption tax and a uniform recycling subsidy, in this case, varying pickup 
frequencies and differential legal disposal subsidies are also required to achieve social optimum. 
42 The other two policies include the per-unit charge with an advance disposal fee and a producer take-
back requirement system. 
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the Pigouvian tax combined with a D-R system applied to all products.  In this context, 
further research on the “two-part instrument” with more general assumptions and wide-





Welfare Effects of the Tax Reforms in Two Vertically-Separated 
Oligopolies with Environmental Externality 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a single imperfectly competitive industry, the output level is less than the 
competitive level due to the divergence between price and marginal cost (so called 
‘marginalization’ distortion). If this imperfectly competitive industry is polluting, the 
second distortion arises from environmental externality. If this polluting oligopolistic 
(upstream) industry supplies its product to another (downstream) industry—in other 
words, if both industries are ‘vertically-separated’—then an input-mix distortion in the 
downstream industry arises due to the marginalization distortion from the upstream 
industry. Furthermore, if the downstream industry is also imperfectly competitive, then 
another marginalization distortion arises. 
It is not difficult to find markets that have these conditions. Many industries 
consist of only a few firms, including automobiles, iron and steel, and petroleum 
refining industries.43 Among them, many are polluting and vertically-separated to other 
oligopolistic industries. For instance, it is well known that coal is one of the most 
polluting fossil fuels, and the U.S. iron and steel industry heavily relies on coal and 
emits various pollutants.44 Furthermore, the U.S. iron and steel industry supplies its 
                                                 
43 For overall market structure and market power by industries in the U.S., see Hall, et al (1986). 
44 As of 1994, the U.S. iron and steel industry accounts for approximately 9 percent of all U.S. 




product to several oligopolistic final goods producers such as automobiles and electrical 
and machinery equipment industries. 
This chapter can be considered as an extension from—as well as a link among— 
various previous studies on taxation, market imperfection, and environmental 
externalities.  However, previous studies have been mostly interested in a single 
oligopolistic industry.45  When vertically-separated oligopolies were considered, the 
pollution problem has not been examined.  Myles (1989) considers two vertically-
separated industries, but only one of them is imperfectly competitive.  Panzar and 
Sibley (1989) consider vertically-separated industries, but they focus on the optimal 
two-part tariff that corrects for the marginalization distortion in the downstream 
industry due to the upstream monopoly.  Colangelo and Galmarini (2001) examine the 
vertically-separated oligopoly case, but their focus is on the relative advantages of 
value-added taxation over cascade taxation when the firms in the upstream industry 
produce intermediate goods.  Furthermore, they only consider the importance of the 
downstream input substitutability, because the upstream producers have a single input 
and, therefore, cannot substitute between inputs. 
In this chapter, I construct an analytical partical equilibrium model of two 
vertically-separated oligopolies where the upstream industry is polluting, and examine 
                                                 
45 For example, Konishi (1990) examines the case where an oligopolistic industry producing a final good 
uses many intermediate goods but the intermediate goods are produced competitively. Although not an 
exhaustive list, the following different aspects of the topic have been studied: the case of symmetric 
oligopoly with a fixed number of firms and various types of technology (Ebert, 1991), the case of 
endogenous market structure (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995a), endogenous entry/exit decisions 
(Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995b), dynamic tax/subsidy schemes when the stock of pollution 
accumulates over time (Benchekroun and Long, 1998), endogenous product quality (Cremer and Thisse, 
1999; Goering and Boyce, 1999), strategy-proof optimal tax schemes (Kim and Chang, 1993; Shaffer, 
1995), general functional forms for demand (Lee, 1999), the link between pollution taxes and firms’ 
financial decisions (Damania, 2000), asymmetric cost functions among producers (Levin, 1985; Simpson, 
1995; Carlsson, 2000), the effects of a shift from specific to ad valorem taxation (Okuguchi and 
Yamazaki, 1994), and the second best environmental taxation with both monopoly and distorting labor 
taxes (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002). 
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the welfare effects of various revenue-neutral tax reforms. The upstream industry 
produces an intermediate good using labor, and it generates pollution. The downstream 
industry produces a final good using the intermediate good and labor. I incorporate the 
above mentioned four distortions into a single framework and introduce four different 
taxes (or subsidies) for purposes of various tax reforms: a tax on the final good, a tax on 
the intermediate good, a tax on pollution, and a lump sum transfer to consumers. In my 
model, both the upstream and downstream producers can substitute one input for 
another. As I will show later, these extensions are important in that they yield 
significantly different results from previous studies. 
I derive an analytical expression for welfare change from various combinations 
of tax instruments. Although I show that it is possible to derive a general form of 
welfare change from various revenue-neutral tax reforms with all these four different 
tax instruments, I focus on two cases. The first is the case that government uses an ad 
valorem tax on the intermediate good. In many cases, it is difficult to use a tax on 
pollution due to administrative and technical difficulties (Fullerton, et al, 2001). 
Therefore, many countries have used various taxes on outputs (or inputs) for the 
environmental purposes (Barthold, 1994). The second case is when government use a 
tax on pollution itself, but not a tax on the intermediate good produced by a polluting 
upstream industry. There might be only a few firms in the two vertically-separated 
oligopolistic industries. If so, both administration problems and technical difficulties on 
monitoring might be overcome by government. For these two different cases, I show 
that the changes in welfare from these tax reforms are functions of the degree of market 
power as well as input substitutability in both industries, and the demand and cost 
structures in both industries. 
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A tax on the intermediate good changes welfare through two separate channels: 
(i) by changing the final good price and (ii) by changing the intermediate good price.  
The marginal change in welfare is the sum of the marginal changes in consumer’s 
surplus as well as producers’ surplus through these two channels.  And it comes from 
the output effect on welfare from the change in intermediate good production. 
My first contribution in this chapter is to identify the third channel that a tax on 
pollution provides. It causes the upstream producers to substitute between inputs by 
changing the relative price of labor to pollution.  This input substitutability provides 
the potential strength of a tax on pollution over a tax on the intermediate good, which 
cannot correctly target the source of the environmental externality when pollution is 
variable per unit of polluting activities. And this relative superiority of a tax on 
pollution over a tax on the intermediate good is maintained regardless of whether a 
lump sum transfer is available. In this chapter, I confirm this point with the case of 
vertically-separated oligopolies with pollution. 
I also examine the directions of various welfare-improving tax reforms in the 
presence of the market distortions. I derive the condition that determines the direction of 
a welfare-improving tax reform. In my model, the profit wedges between the unit price 
and the unit cost in both industries can be interpreted as a simple barometer that shows 
how serious are the corresponding industry’s inefficiencies. With the marginal 
environmental damages (MED) is included in the model, these marginality conditions 
for profit decides which tax instruments should be used to improve welfare. Suppose 
that the distortion from pollution is more serious than the distortions from market 
imperfection in this economy. Then, the intermediate good production should be 
discouraged, even if that would aggravate the pre-existing distortions from market 
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imperfection. If a lump sum transfer is feasible and government can only use a tax on 
the output of the upstream industry—with no possibility of a tax on pollution—then it 
should levy a tax on the intermediate good and use the revenue to give a subsidy to 
consumers.  On the contrary, if the size of environmental damages is smaller than the 
size of the upstream industry’s profit, then it means that the inefficiency problems 
arising from the upstream industry’s market imperfection are more serious than the 
pollution problem.  Then, government should tax consumers and use this revenue to 
subsidize the upstream industry to increase the production of intermediate good. 
In Section 3.2, I present the model and discuss the impact of taxation on the two 
oligopolistic industries.  In Section 3.3, I derive the general welfare expression for 
various revenue-neutral tax reforms.  The welfare effects of the tax reforms when lump 
sum transfer is available are discussed in Section 3.4.  Section 3.5 examines the cases 
of tax reforms when a tax on the final good is used in revenue-neutral way instead of a 
lump sum transfer.  Section 3.6 is the conclusion. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
My model is based on those of Colangelo and Galmarini (2001) and Fullerton, et 
al (2001). My model consists of a representative consumer, the government, and two 
vertically-separated oligopolistic industries (downstream and upstream). And it is a 
partial equilibrium model. The upstream industry produces an intermediate good ( )X  
using labor ( )XL  and pollution emissions ( )E , with a constant returns to scale 
technology. The downstream industry produces the final consumption good ( )Y  using 
the intermediate good ( )X  and labor ( )YL , also with a constant returns to scale 
technology. I assume that the product in each industry is homogeneous and that the 
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numbers of firms in each industry is fixed. Labor is assumed untaxed and competitively 
supplied. 
The representative consumer demands the final consumption good.  I assume 
that the representative consumer’s overall utility is separable and linear in both labor 
and pollution: ( ) ( ) ( ),  ,  U Y L E U Y L D E= − − , where X YL L L= + . The damage 
function ( )D E  denotes the disutility to consumer from the aggregate emissions ( )E . 
The consumer suffers from E , but she ignores the effect of her own purchases on the 
aggregate pollution of producers.46 Then, the inverse demand for Y  is: 
 
  ( ),   p p Y w= ,   (3.1) 
 
where w  is the wage rate, p  is the consumer price for Y , and 0Yp p Y≡ ∂ ∂ < .   
In this chapter, I use subscripts to denote the first derivatives as in Yp  except for the 
indices that denote individual producers, as in jx  and iy . In contrast, a superscript 
denotes the industry that a variable represents, as in XL  and YL . 
 
3.2.1 Downstream Industry 
Each downstream firm ( )  1,...,i i m=  produces its final good ( )iy  using 
labor and the intermediate good in a constant returns to scale technology.47 Total 






= ∑ . 
                                                 
46 This assumption is appropriate if the number of consumers is large. In my model, the consumer 
represents the choice of many price-taking consumers. This can be interpreted to mean that many 
consumers lie on a continuum from zero to one, so that the aggregate size of the population is normalized 
to one. 
47 As in Konishi (1990), I implicitly assume that market inefficiency due to imperfect competition comes 
from the fixed number of firms and their conjectural behaviors, not from the existence of fixed costs and 
decreasing average costs. 
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Each downstream firm maximizes its own profit function: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,  ,  Y Y Yi it p Y w c q w yπ ⎡ ⎤= − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , (3.2) 
 
where q  is the price of the intermediate good, Yt  is the ad valorem tax rate levied on 
the consumer price of Y , and  ( ),  Yc q w  is the unit cost function. Downstream profit 
is assumed to be non-negative and untaxed.48 And the downstream firms take q  as 
fixed in choosing their outputs (and inputs). 
I also assume that each downstream firm shares a common conjecture ( )Yv  
about how the other firms in its industry will respond to a change in its output level.  







≡ , (3.3) 
 
where i ii iY y y ′′≠= +∑  and 0 Yv m≤ ≤ . For example, 0Yv =  generates the 
Bertrand equilibrium with competitive marginal cost pricing, 1Yv =  represents 
Cournot behavior, and Yv m=  corresponds to perfectly collusive behavior. 
Given these conjectures, the first-order necessary condition for the firm’s 
optimizing choice of  0iy >   is that the downstream firm’s perceived marginal profit 
must be equal to zero:49 
 
                                                 
48 However, a lump sum tax on consumer is equivalent to a profit tax. See Subsection 3.2.4 for the 
detailed discussion. 
49 Note that this first-order condition is not for any  0
i





  ( )1 0.Y Yi
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dp dY
t p y c
dY dy
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟− + − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 (3.4) 
 
The solution to (3.4) yields an industry with m  equal-sized firms. Aggregate 











⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⋅ − =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
, (3.5) 
 
where ( ),  Y pp w pY Yε ≡ −  is the elasticity of product demand, and 
[ ]0,  1Y Yv mβ ≡ ∈  is the degree of conjectural variation of the downstream firm, 
normalized between zero and one. Thus, implicit collusion among firms increases as 
Yβ  becomes closer to one. This parameter can be interpreted as the aggregate 
conjectural variation or the market power parameter.50 The left-hand side (LHS) of 
(3.5) is a downstream firm’s perceived marginal revenue. 
For 0iy > , I assume that the following existence conditions hold, as in 
Colangelo and Galmarini (2001): 
 
  Y Yε β> ,    1Yt < ,    and    ( ) ( )1 0,  Y Yc t p w< − ⋅ . (3.6) 
 
                                                 
50 Therefore, market imperfection comes from the two different sources: first, from the conjectural 
behaviors of firms ( )Yv  and second, from the number of firms (m ).  I use the normalized aggregate 
conjectural variation, however, because my paper does not distinguish between these two factors. This 




To guarantee the second-order condition, I also assume that the well-known 
Stern’s condition is satisfied (Stern, 1987): 
 








⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟≡ − − >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, (3.7) 
 
where the term Y Yppε ε  in the bracket is the price elasticity of the elasticity of demand 
for Y  and is always positive.51 Equation (3.7) is the effect on perceived marginal 
revenue of a marginal increase in price. Then, the solution function for the final product 
price is: 
 
  ( ),   ,   Yp q w tϕ= . (3.8) 
In order to see how the inverse demand for Y  changes as q  and Yt  vary, 
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≡ = = >
−−
. (3.9b) 
The final good price is raised either by an increase in the price of the intermediate good 
or by an increase in the ad valorem tax on the final good. 
 
                                                 
51 To obtain (3.7), differentiate the LHS of (3.5) with respect to p . 
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3.2.2 Upstream Industry 
Using a constant returns to scale technology, each upstream firm 
( )  1,...,j j n=  produces intermediate good ( )jx  using labor and generates pollution 
( )je . 52  Following the conventional approach widely used in the environmental 
economics literature, I model the aggregate production function for the intermediate 











= ∑ , 
has a harmful effect on overall environmental quality and can be disposal of gaseous, 
liquid, and solid waste used to produce output. This external effect can be captured in 
the environmental damage function ( )D E , where the marginal environmental damages 
(MED) 0ED > . I assume that the government as an environmental regulator can 
monitor firms’ pollution in some cases. I also assume that the enforcement of its 
environmental policies is effective. Therefore, my paper does not concern 
administrative, monitoring, or enforcement problems. 
Note that the production function for X  has variable pollution per unit of 
output. If the environmental externality is fixed per unit of polluting activities, then the 
choice of environmental tax instruments becomes trivial since an output tax becomes 
identical to an emissions tax (Fullerton, et al, 2001).53 By modeling explicitly the 
variable relationship between pollution and per unit of output, however, I can show how 
an output tax affects welfare differently compared to an emissions tax. 
An upstream firm acts simultaneously with every other intermediate good 
producer to maximize the following profit function with respect to its own output jx : 
                                                 
52 Pollution 
j
e  and aggregate pollution E  could be measured in tons of emissions such as SO2, NOX, 
or CO2. Then damages ( )D E  are measured in units of utility. Emission E  could be taxed if each 
firm’s tons of SO2 or CO2 can be monitored accurately. For some pollutants, such monitoring is more 
difficult. 





 ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,  ,  ,  X X Y Xj jt q X w t c r w xπ ⎡ ⎤= − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , (3.10) 
 
where Xt  is the ad valorem tax rate levied on the price of the intermediate good and 
( ),  Xc r w  is the unit cost function. The function ( ),  ,  Yq X w t  is the inverse function 
of the derived demand for X , which can be derived from the equilibrium aggregate 
demand for X  using the solution function for the final product price.54 
The unit cost function is a function of the full price of polluting the environment 
(r ), which is the sum of the hidden, internal price of using the environment as an input  
( )0r  and a specific tax rate on pollution ( )Et . The polluting firms cannot completely 
ignore any environmental consequences from their operation, even when there exist 
neither explicit environmental regulations nor any legal requirements for the 
environmentally harmful production activities. Firms might simply want to project an 
environmentally friendly image to the public (Gangadharan, 2001), or voluntary 
pollution abatement might be used as a barrier to potential entry (Helland and Matsuno, 
2003). Environmental regulation tends to change frequently, and anticipating a stricter 
regulation, firms might prepare themselves by investing pollution abatement 
equipments (Lee and Alm, 2004).55 Furthermore, normative and social motivations are 
as influential as economic motivations in initiating an effort to reduce pollution (Winter 
and May, 2001; Lai, et al, 2003).56 Therefore, the term 0r  can be viewed as the price 
                                                 
54 See (3.15) and (3.16) below for the derivation of the inverse function of the derived demand for the 
intermediate good. 
55 This kind of motive would be weakened if the grandfathering environmental policies are expected by 
the polluting firms. 
56 As Earnhart (2004) shows, community characteristics can affect regulatory decisions to intervene 
against specific facilities with inspections and penalties. If the polluting firms anticipate this, they might 
be willing to initiate pollution abatement, even in a limited magnitude. 
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that the upstream producers pay for using the environment without any environmental 
tax or any explicit environmental regulations.57 I assume that 0 0r > . Then, Et  
serves as one of many possible environmental policy instruments to curtail the 
discrepancy between r  and 0r . I also assume that the relationship between 0r  and  
Et  is independent from each other for analytical simplicity: 0 0Edr dt =  and, 
therefore, Edr dt= . 
Again, I assume that each upstream firm conjectures that a change in its own 
output alters total industry output by a constant: X jv dX dx≡ , where 0
Xv n≤ ≤  
and nj jj jX x x ′′≠= +∑ . 
Define the elasticity of the derived demand for the intermediate good as 
( ),  ,  X Y qq w t qX Xε ≡ − , define the normalized conjectural variation of the upstream 
industry as [ ]  0,  1X Xv nβ ≡ ∈ , and aggregate the first-order condition from the 














⎢ ⎥⋅ − =⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (3.11) 
 
The elasticity of the derived demand for the intermediate good ( )Xε  can be 
rewritten as follows:58 
 
  1
Y YY Y Y
qX w






⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= + − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (3.12) 
                                                 
57 However, this internal price ( 0r ) might be sometimes perceived as non-environmental by firms. For 
example, Joshi, et al (2002) report that firms’ accounting systems tend to classify incorrectly the 
substantial amount of costs incurred due to environmental reasons, and they are often unaware of 
existence and magnitude of these costs. 




where Yσ  denotes the input substitution elasticity between YL  and X  in production 
of Y . 
The upstream industry’s existence and stability conditions are analogous to 
those of the downstream industry, namely: 
 
 X Xε β> ,  1Xt < ,  1Et < ,   and  ( ) ( )1 0,  ,  X Yw t q w t< − ⋅ , (3.13) 
and 








⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟≡ − − >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, (3.14) 
 
where the term X Xqqε ε  in the bracket is the price elasticity of the elasticity of the 
derived demand for X  and is always positive.59 
By Shepard’s lemma, the equilibrium aggregate demand for X  is given by: 
 
  ( ) ( ),  ,  YqX c q w Y p w= ⋅ . 
Rewrite it, using (3.8), to obtain: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ),  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  .Y Y YqX c q w Y q w t w X q w tϕ= ⋅ =  (3.15) 
 
Define ( )22Y Yqqc c q≡ ∂ ∂ . Then, since 
Y Y
q qq q p qX X q c Y c Y ϕ≡ ∂ ∂ = +  is 
negative and finite as long as Yqqc  is negative and finite, I can invert (3.9) to obtain the 
derived demand function:60 
                                                 




  ( ),  ,  Yq q X w t= , (3.16) 
 
where 0Xq <  and 0Ytq < .61 
From (3.11), the equilibrium price function for the intermediate good can be 
rewritten by using the corresponding existence and stability conditions (since 
0 Er r t= + ): 
 
  ( ) ( )0,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  .X Y X Y Eq r w t t r w t t tξ ξ= =  (3.17) 
 
Note that q  is endogenous, because the upstream sector is explicitly analyzed in my 
model. 
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To see how taxes affect prices, totally differentiate (3.11) and use the definition 
of XG  in (3.14) to get: 
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60 If inputs are not perfect substitutes for each other, then Y
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where YX X Yt tε ε≡ ∂ ∂ . The partial derivatives of (3.17) with respect to 
Xt , Yt , and 














































Equations (3.20a) and (3.20c) show that either a tax on upstream producers’ 
output ( )Xt  or a tax on their pollution  ( )Et  increase the intermediate good price 
( )q , since both increase the intermediate good’s marginal cost of production.  
However, the sign of (3.20b) is ambiguous. If the upstream industry applies competitive 
marginal cost pricing ( )0Xβ = , then the change in downstream tax Yt  has no effect 
on the price of upstream intermediate good. On the other hand, if the upstream industry 
has some degree of market power ( )0Xβ > , then the sign of (3.20b) critically depends 
on the sign of YXtε , which denotes how the downstream taxation changes the elasticity 
of the derived demand for X . In particular, if 0YXtε > , that is, 
Xε  becomes more 
elastic as Yt  is raised, then Yt  would decrease q . For example, if the curvature of 
                                                                                                                                               
61 See (3.20b) below and the subsequent discussion about the sign of Y
t
q . 
62 Recall that Edr dt=  since I assumed that 0 0r >  but 0 0dr = . 
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demand function for Y  is concave or weakly convex (i.e., linear or exponential), then 
0YXtε > , and an increase in 
Yt  would decrease q .63 
To see the effects of tax rates on the final good price, differentiate (3.18) with 
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Equations (3.21a) and (3.21c) show that both upstream Xt  and Et  increase 
final output price p . However, the sign of (3.21b) is ambiguous. Unlike Xt  and Et ,   
a tax on the final good ( )Yt  has two channels through which it affects p . The first 
term in the right hand side (RHS) of (3.21b) denotes the direct effect that makes p  
increase with Yt , while the second term denotes the indirect effect that works through 
the change in q . The sign of this indirect effect is determined by the sign of YXtε  as 
already shown in (3.20b). Therefore, the final sign of (3.21b) is determined by the 
relative size of the direct and indirect effects.  A sufficient condition for (3.21b) to be 
positive is that 0YXtε ≤ . Even if 0Y
X
tε > , however, as is the case for most product 
demand specifications, it would be difficult to find a case where the indirect effect 
                                                 
63 However, if  0YX
t
ε =   (i.e., isoelastic demand), then  Yt would have no effect on  q   even if  
0Xβ > . 
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outweighs the direct effect such that the final sign of (3.21b) is negative (Colangelo and 
Galmarini, 2001). 
 
3.3 WELFARE CHANGES FROM TAX REFORMS 
In this subsection, I derive the general welfare expression that will be used for 
various tax reforms in the following sections. The economy is assumed to have no 
revenue requirement, so taxes are used merely to lessen the distortions caused by 
imperfect competition as well as by the externality. This chapter does not examine the 
problems of optimal taxation. Solving an optimal taxation problem is more difficult 
than solving a tax reform problem. It is possible to obtain analytical solution for optimal 
taxes only in very restrictive cases. Since the main interest of my paper is about how the 
government can improve welfare by introducing a revenue-neutral tax-subsidy reform 
in the presence of vertically-separated oligopolies, I focus on tax system rather than 
optimal taxation. 
I start from an arbitrary tax system, where rates are not necessarily set optimally.  
Then, I solve for the effects on welfare of a proposed tax reform that is, an increase in 
one tax rate with a revenue-neutral decrease in some other tax rate. First, I examine 
what factors determine the direction of welfare change from that particular tax reform.  
Then, if the effect on welfare is positive, which is interpreted as a good tax reform, I 
examine the factors that determine the magnitude of welfare change.64 
                                                 
64 It is uncertain whether that is the best possible small tax reform, however, because there might be a 
larger increase in welfare by raising some other tax rate and/or lowering some other tax rate. If my result 




Given the assumptions on consumer preferences and other agents in this 
economy, social welfare is defined as the unweighted sum of consumers’ and 
producers’ surplus as follows: 
 
  ( ),  ,  ,  
X Y
X Y E TW W t t t T CS
w
∏ +∏ +
= = +  (3.22) 
 
where consumer surplus is defined as  ( )( ) ( ) ( ),  ,  CS U Y p w p Y p w w D E≡ − ⋅ − .  
The producers’ surplus  ( )PS  consists of the upstream and downstream industries’ 
profit functions: ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,  ,  ,  X X Y Xt q X w t c r w X⎡ ⎤Π = − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,  ,  Y Y Yt p Y w c q w Y⎡ ⎤Π = − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , respectively. The government tax revenue is 
given as:65 
 
  ( ) .X Y E Y Y X E Xq rT t qX t pY t E t p c t q t c Y⎡ ⎤= + + = + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (3.23) 
 
Totally differentiate (3.23), assuming no pre-existing taxes 
( )0X Y Et t t T= = = = , to get: 
 
  ( )Y X Y X Y Eq r qdT qc dt pdt c c dt Y= + + . (3.24) 
 
This is the change in the lump sum transfer necessary for government to balance the 
budget when introducing other new taxes. Totally differentiate (3.22), substitute (3.24) 
into it, and use  1dW dT w=   from (3.22) to get: 
                                                 
65 By Shepard’s lemma, Y
q
X c Y=  and X X Y
r r q
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. (3.25) 
 
Rewrite (3.25) as:66 
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Equation (3.26) shows how the government can improve welfare by initiating a 
revenue-neutral tax reform when a lump sum transfer is available.  The government 
can use any (or all) of three possible tax instruments: a tax on pollution ( )Et , and two 
taxes on outputs  ( Xt   and  Yt ).  All tax reforms have in common two separate 
channels through which change welfare.  The first term containing  Yε   in each 
large bracket denotes how the introduction of a small  Xt   (or  Yt   or  Et )  and 
the corresponding change in  T   affect welfare through  p .  This marginal change 
                                                 
66 See Appendix B.2 for derivation of (3.26). 
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in welfare is the sum of the marginal changes in  CS   and  PS ,  which is closely 
related to the change in consumer demand for  Y   due to the change in  p   (i.e.,  
Yε ).  Therefore, this is the “output effect” on welfare from the change in  Y .67 
On the other hand, the second term containing  Yσ   in each large bracket 
denotes how the introduction of a small  Xt   (or  Yt   or  Et )  and the matching 
change in  T   alter welfare through  q .  Again, this marginal change in welfare is 
the sum of the marginal changes in  CS   and  PS ,  which is closely related to the 
change in cost of   Y   and the downstream firms’ technological ability to 
accommodate the effects of a tax on cost by substituting  YL   for  X   (i.e.,  Yσ ).  
Therefore, this is the output effect on welfare from the change in  X .  (Or, this could 
be called a substitution effect in  Y ,  since output of  X   is an input to  Y .) 
In addition to these two common channels, the combination of  Et   and  T   
(i.e.,  EdW dt )  has another way to change welfare:  the third, last term in the large 
bracket containing  Xσ .  This change comes not from the changes of either  p   or  
q ,  but from the marginal change in cost of  X .  A specific tax on pollution directly 
affects the upstream producers’ cost by changing the relative input price.  This is the 
“substitution effect” on welfare from the change in  E . 
Market imperfection usually prescribes a subsidy for (rather than a tax on) the 
market output because a tax would decrease the already suboptimal level of production 
due to market imperfection.  On the other hand, the presence of environmental 
                                                 
67 The reason that 
E
D E  is multiplied by  w   is as follows. The utility function is defined as  
( ) ( )U U Y L D E= − − ,  which essentially means that utility is measured in labor hours 
( )1U L∂ ∂ = − .  If utility is measured in labor hours, then multiplication by w  yields dollars.  
Since  
E
D   is in utils ( )U E∂ ∂ , multiply by  w  to get hours.  Equivalently in (3.26), divide 
( )X YΠ + Π   by w   to get utils for  EdW dt  (which is measured in utils). 
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externality prescribes policy makers to levy a tax.68  Simultaneous presence of market 
imperfection and environmental externality, however, could offer policy makers 
conflicting recommendations, especially when taxes or subsidies are employed for their 
corrective roles in lessening inefficiencies. 
While many studies of the optimal taxation provide relatively clear rules and 
answers on the effects of tax policies in various market conditions, it is difficult to find 
actual taxes based on these principles.  Many taxes are not correctly targeted to the 
sources of inefficiencies, due to administrative and technological difficulties, and few 
environmental taxes are believed to set optimally (OECD, 1995 and 1999b; Fullerton, et 
al, 2001).  Political considerations or the practical problems of design and 
implementation such as who is to be taxed are often the most important factors that 
determine the types of policy tools employed (Barthold, 1994). Therefore, it is 
important to know welfare-improving directions of a tax reform and what factors decide 
it before the government initiates a tax reform. And this might be an important starting 
point to implement a full-fledged optimal tax policy, especially in the case of vertically-
separated oligopolies with pollution, where various distortions are interlinked. 
The above welfare expression (3.26) does exactly that.  It provides the 
conditions that decide the direction of a welfare-improving tax reform. However, (3.26) 
is expressed in ‘total’ terms containing industry profits ( XΠ  and YΠ ), which make it 
difficult interpret. So I reaarange (3.26), using (B2.6), to obtain:  
 
                                                 
68 This tax would apply to output if pollution is fixed per unit of output.  More generally, as here, it is a 
tax per unit of pollution created by production or consumption activities, set equal to the marginal 
environmental damage (MED) (Pigou, 1932; Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
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( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 .
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⎡ ⎤= − − − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (3.26a) 
 
The term ( )Xq c−  represents the upstream industry’s profit wedge, which is 
the difference between the product price ( )q  and the unit (marginal) cost ( )Xc . Note 






⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ − =⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  X Xβ ε< ,  and [ ]0,  1Xβ ∈ . 
Similarly, ( ) 0Yp c− ≥  represents the downstream industry’s profit wedge. Another 
term XE rwD c  in (3.26a) is the MED from the pollution emitted by the upstream 
industry. Note that there is no term for the MED in the downstream industry’s profit 
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= − − − . (3.26b) 
 
3.4 WELFARE IMPROVING TAX POLICIES WITH A LUMP SUM TRANSFER TO 
CONSUMER 
 
3.4.1 Welfare Improving Tax Policies with a Lump Sum Transfer to Consumer 
Suppose that government uses a tax on the intermediate good  ( )Xt   and a 
lump sum transfer to consumer  ( )T .  Set  0Y Edt dt= =   in (3.26) and use 
(3.20a), (3.21a), (3.26a), and (3.26b) to obtain: 
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⎡ ⎤− − + − ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎟⎜= − − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− − ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.27) 
 
With no environmental damages ( )0ED = , the above (3.27) is always non-
positive, which means that the government can improve welfare by using  0Xt <   
(and  0T > ).  This extends the results from previous environmental studies to the 
case of two vertically-separated industries: the marginalization distortion can be 
lessened by a subsidy (Buchanan, 1969; Barnett, 1980). 
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The above result shows that there are two separate channels through which the 
government can improve welfare by using  Xt   and  T :  (i) through affecting the 
price of final good  ( )XpW dp dt  and (ii) through affecting the price of intermediate 
good  ( )XqW dq dt .  The above result also shows that the magnitude of welfare 
change depends on several important industry parameters: the elasticities of demand 
( Xε  and  Yε ),  the market powers in both industries ( Xβ  and  Yβ ), the cost 
structure of the downstream industry ( Yqc  and  
Y
wc ), the input substitutability of the 
downstream firms ( )Yσ , the both industries’ profit wedges along with the MED 
included: ( ) ( )X X Y YE r qq c wD c c p c− − + − . 
Recall that from (3.26), the marginal change in welfare comes from the two 
separate “marginal” changes.  The first source of the welfare change is  XpW dp dt .  
This consists of various parameters such as the elasticity of demand ( )Yε   and the 
marginal cost of the downstream industry ( )Yqc .  Multiplied by these “marginal” 
parameters, the first term in (3.26), as a whole, represents the “marginal” change in 
welfare by the introduction of a small tax on the intermediate good ( )Xt  through 
affecting the price of final good.  The same logic is applied to the second term in 
(3.26). 
Keeping this point in mind, the expression (3.27) provides an interesting 
condition that decides the direction of the tax reform: 
( ) ( )X X Y YE r qq c wD c c p c− − + − . These terms can be interpreted as how serious the 
corresponding distortion is to social welfare. In my model, the upstream industry is the 
source of three inefficiencies: the environmental damages, the marginalization 
distortion, and the downstream industry’s input-mix distortion caused by this 
marginalization distortion.  Therefore, the upstream industry’s profit wedge along with 
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the MED included can be interpreted as a signal to the government that shows how 
serious are the distortions from market imperfection in the upstream industry as well as 
from pollution. Similarly, the downstream industry’s profit wedge represents how 
serious the distortion from the downstream market imperfection is. 
If the wedges from the distortions in both industries are negative, that is, if 
( ) ( ) 0X X Y YE r qq c wD c c p c− − + − < , which makes the sign of (3.27) positive, then 
intermediate good production should be discouraged in this second-best world with no  
Et ,  even if doing so would aggravate the distortions from market imperfection.  And 
the policy recommendation should be a tax on the intermediate good ( )0Xt > . 
On the contrary, if ( ) 0X X YE r qq c wD c c− − > , which makes the sign of (3.27) 
negative, then a welfare-improving, revenue-neutral tax reform consists of a subsidy for 
the upstream industry ( )0Xt <  and a lump sum tax on consumers ( )0T > .  The 
subsidy for  X   makes production increase and price fall in the upstream industry. 
The decrease in price reduces profits, but it raises consumer surplus. At the same time, 
the lump sum tax on consumers reduces consumer income, while the subsidy increases 
profits.  The final effect would be the increase in both profits and welfare. 
However, if ( ) ( ) 0X X Y YE r qq c wD c c p c− − + − >  but 
( ) 0X XE rq c wD c− − < ,  then the final sign of (3.27) becomes ambiguous. The input 
substitutability of the downstream industry  ( )Yσ   emerges as an important factor in 
this case.  If the downstream firms can freely substitute inputs  X   and  YL ,  the 
upstream industry’s market power substantially weakens.  Then, a tax on  X  would 
greatly improve welfare by reducing environmental damages, while it would not so 
much aggravate the distortions from the upstream industry’s imperfect competition.  If  
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Yσ   is sufficiently high, then the sign of the whole welfare expression (3.27) becomes 
positive.  In that case, government can improve welfare by taxing intermediate good. 
Would a subsidy for the intermediate good  ( )0Xt <  generate more pollution 
due to the decrease in price ( )q  and the resulting increase in demand by the 
downstream industry?  Should the government reduce the subsidy level if it takes into 
account the possible additional environmental damages that might result from the 
subsidy?  The answer is no.  Consider the nature of the lump sum transfer to 
consumers in this case.  With the initial condition of no pre-existing taxes, a subsidy 
for  X   results in more  X ,  more  E ,  lower  q ,  and more Y .  Revenue 
from consumers exactly compensates these effects because a lump sum tax on 
consumers is not really a different instrument but a compensated income for the subsidy 
for  X . 
 
3.4.2 A Tax on Pollution with a Lump Sum Transfer to Consumer 
The case of using only a tax on pollution  ( )Et   can be obtained by setting  
0X Ydt dt= =   in (3.26): 
 
  
( ) ( )
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r w E r w E
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c c Y q c wD c c p cdW
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c c X q c wD c c wD E
qc G r c
ε
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⎡ ⎤− − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= −
− −
− +
    (3.28) 
 
Note that the first two terms in (3.28) are similar to those in (3.27).  If the 
government introduces a tax on pollution ( )0Et > ,  then the price of the intermediate 
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good  ( )q   increases, which in turn raises the production cost of  Y   as well as  
p .  This causes the product demand for  Y   to decrease.  Then, the downstream 
industry’s derived demand for  X   falls.  The first term containing  Yε   in (3.28) 
shows this output effect of  Et   through the downstream industry.  On the other 
hand, the increase in  q   makes the downstream firms substitute from  X   into  
YL ,  which has now become relatively cheaper due to the introduction of  Et .  This 
output effect on  X  due to the input substitution by the downstream industry is 
captured in the second term containing  Yσ   in (3.28). Note that these two effects are 
also present in (3.27) and come about from a single source: the decrease in production 
of X . 
Ignoring the last Yσ  term for the time being, the signs of the first two terms in 
(3.28) depends on the signs of the profit wedge, as already explained in (3.27).  For 
example, if ( ) ( ) 0X X YE rq c wD c p c− − + − < , then the sign of (3.28) becomes 
positive.  And government can improve welfare by using  0Et >   and  0T < .  
On the other hand, if ( ) 0X XE rq c wD c− − > , then the signs of the first two terms in 
(3.28) are both negative.  It means that if the government has only Et  at its disposal 
( Xt  must be zero), then government should introduce 0Et <  and 0T >   to 
improve welfare.  This particular policy recommendation appears against common 
sense because the polluting activity is being subsidized rather than penalized.  
However, it is perfectly understandable if considered in the context of social welfare.  
If ( ) 0X XE rq c wD c− − > , it means that the price wedge in the upstream industry is big 
even considering the MED. Hence, the distortions from the upstream industry’s 
imperfect competition are most pressing. Therefore, the production of X  should be 
encouraged, even if the only way to do that is a subsidy for E . By doing so, the price 
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of X  would fall and the downstream firms’ derived demand for X  would increase. 
As a result, the double marginalization as well as the input-mix distortions lessens. 
However, note that the last term that has Yσ  in (3.28) is always positive, which 
denotes the input substitution effect of Et . This effect comes from the fact that a tax on 
pollution correctly targets the source of distortion (Fullerton, et al, 2001).  Equation 
(3.28) shows that this superiority of  Et   to  Xt   is also valid in the case of 
vertically-separated oligopolies with pollution. To see this point more clearly, assume 
Bertrand competition in both industries. Set 1X YG G= = ,  Yp c= ,  Xq c=  and 
0X Yβ β= =  in both (3.27) and (3.28) to get: 
 
 0
Y Y Y Y
q E w E
X Y
qc wD EdW c wD E
dt wp c
ε σ
= + >  (3.29a) 
and 
 0 0
Y X Y Y X Y X X
r q E r w E w E
E Y X
c c wD EdW c c wD E c wD E
dt wp qc r c
ε σ σ
= + + > . (3.29b) 
 
With no distortions from imperfect competition in either industry, there remains 
only one inefficiency in my model: the distortion from pollution ( )ED .  In this case, 
the government can always improve welfare by introducing either  Xt   or  Et   
incrementally as shown in (3.29a) and (3.29b), respectively.  The first two terms in 
both expressions reflect the welfare gain from the output effect due to decrease in X .  
However, (3.29b) has the third, positive term, which is the input substitution effect 




3.5 TAX POLICIES WITH NO LUMP SUM TRANSFER 
Now, I examine the cases that a lump sum transfer is not feasible nor any other 
tax to raise revenue that can be used to pay for subsidies or to rebate revenue.  Again, I 
start at an initial equilibrium with no pre-existing taxes.  Government uses a tax on (or 
a subsidy for)  Y   to balance the budget when it introduces a new tax on (or a 
subsidy for) the upstream industry ( Xt   or   )Et .  In this case, two different 
combinations of tax reforms are available to the government:  ( ),  X Yt t   and  
( ),  E Yt t .69 
Set  0dT =   in (3.25), assuming no pre-existing taxes, to get: 
 
  Y X EqX Edt dt dt
pY pY
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= − −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (3.30) 
This is the change in  Yt   necessary for government to balance the budget when 
introducing either  Xt   or  Et . 
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⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥= − + −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎢ ⎥− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎟⎜+ − +⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (3.31) 
 
                                                 
69 I do not consider the case of ( ),  X Et t , for reasons explained above. 
70 See Appendix B.3 for derivation of (3.31). 
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Equation (3.31) shows how the government can improve welfare by using various tax 
reforms when a lump sum transfer is infeasible. 
 
3.5.1 Ad Valorem Taxes on Both Goods 
In this section, I consider the case that the government can only use output 
taxation for both industries:  Yt   and  Xt .  Set  0Edt =   in (3.31) to get: 
 
 p qX X Y X Y
dW dp dp qX dq dq qX
W W
dt dt dt pY dt dt pY
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= − + −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (3.32) 
 
When a lump sum transfer is available, only  Xt   affects prices  Xdp dt   
and  Xdq dt   as shown earlier in (3.27), since a lump sum transfer does not change 
the relative price.  However, when a lump sum transfer is not available, not only  Xt   
but also  Yt   affects both  p   and  q .  Moreover, unlike a lump sum transfer,  
Yt   changes the prices in more complicated ways.   While  Yt   changes  q   
directly, it affects  p   in two ways: the direct effect on the final good price  
( )Yp t∂ ∂   and the indirect one through the intermediate price  ( )( )Yp q dq dt∂ ∂ . 
Substitute (3.20a), (3.20b), (3.21a), (3.21b), (3.26a), (3.26b), (B2.6) and (B2.7) 
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 (3.33) 
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reflects the downstream industry’s degree of market power.  And the third term  
( )2YX X X Xtq pGβ ε ε   represents the effect of downstream taxation on the price of the 
final good through the change of the price of intermediate good.  Combining these 
terms, the first line of (3.33) represents the welfare effect generated by the change in the 
product demand for  Y ,  while the second line captures the welfare effect resulting 
from the change in the derived demand for  X . 
Using the definitions of  XG   from (3.14), the first term in the large brackets 
















−⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ − =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− +
. (3.34) 
If the elasticity of the derived demand for  X   by the downstream industry is 
not increasing in  q ,  that is, if  0Xqε ≤ ,  then (3.34) is greater than or equal to 
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one.71   The second component of the large bracket in the first line of (3.33),  
( )1 Y Yβ ε⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  is always less than one because it is already assumed that  
Y Yε β>   
in (3.6).  Therefore, the difference between these two components is positive.  
Furthermore, if the elasticity of the derived demand for  X   is not decreasing in  Yt ,  
that is, if  0YXtε ≥ ,  which is a reasonable assumption for most demand profiles, the 
third component of the large bracket in the first line of (3.33) is also positive.  Hence, 
the sign of the large bracket in the first line of (3.33) is positive.  In the same fashion, 
it can be shown that the sign of the large bracket in the second line of (3.33) is also 
positive.  Therefore, the overall sign of (3.33) again depends only on the industry 
profit conditions. 
The above two conditions that  0Xqε ≤   and  0Y
X
t
ε ≥   ensure that the 
corresponding tax/subsidy scheme will be more effective, by strengthening or 
weakening the upstream industry’s market power in a certain direction.  For example, 
if ( ) 0X XE rq c wD c− − > , which denotes the situation where the market imperfection 
problem in the upstream industry is more damaging to welfare than the environmental 
problem, then the government could improve welfare using  0Xt <   and  0Yt > .   
A subsidy for  X   reduces  q .  However, the first condition  0Xqε ≤   keeps the 
downstream producers’ elasticity of the derived demand for  X   from becoming less 
elastic due to this decrease in  q ,  which means that the upstream industry’s market 
power weakens.  On the other hand, a tax on  Y   raises  q ,  but the second 
condition  0YXtε ≥   ensures that this tax on  Y   does not increase  q   further 
through changing  Xε ,  which keeps the upstream firms’ market power weak. 
                                                 
71 Both  0XG >   and  ( )1 0X Xβ ε− >⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .  Hence,  ( )1 0
X X XGβ ε− >⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
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However, if ( ) ( ) 0Y X X YE r qp c q c wD c c− + − − < ,  which means that the 
environmental problem is more severe than the market imperfection problem in both 
industries, then a tax reform should be reversed to  0Xt >   and  0Yt < .  First,  
0Xt >   increases  q ,  but  0Xqε ≤   means that this increase in  q   does not 
make  Xε   more elastic.  Second,  0YXtε ≥   ensures that  0
Yt <   does not 
decrease  q .  Therefore, the upstream market power is at least maintained same or 
strengthened.  However, government levies  0Xt >   and tolerates the higher  q ,  
since the higher  q   means the less  X   and consequently, the smaller  EwD E ,  
which lessens the more pressing pollution problem.  Again, this is all where  Et   is 
not available, and where the revenue effect of a change in  Yt   must offset the 
revenue effect of a change in  Xt . 
 
3.5.2 Emissions Tax 
In this section, I consider the case where government uses the combination of  
Et   and  Yt .  Set  0Xdt =   in (3.31) and use (B2.6), (B2.7), (3.20b), (3.20c), 
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⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎟⎜= − − − +⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤






As  Et   is levied on the upstream industry, the input substitutability of the 
upstream industry ( )Xσ  appears in the welfare expression in addition to other factors 
affecting the magnitude of welfare change.  Note that the sign of (3.40) is now 
determined by two factors: the profit wedges in both industries as well as the input 
substitutability of the upstream producers. 
Only a tax on pollution  ( )Et   can bring in not only the downstream firms’ 
input substitution effect but also the upstream firms’ input substitution effect.  The 
existence of the upstream firms’ input substitutability strengthens the reason to tax 
pollution of the upstream industry, and subsidize the downstream industry, if  
( ) ( ) 0Y X X YE r qp c q c wD c c− + − − < . Moreover, the upstream firms’ input 
substitutability weakens the need to subsidize pollution of the upstream industry, if  
( ) 0X XE rq c wD c− − > .  If the size of environmental damages to welfare is greater 
than the upstream industry’s profit but is smaller than the sum of both industries’ profits 
(i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )0Y X X Y X XE r q E rp c q c wD c c q c wD c− + − − < < − − ),  then the first term 
in (3.40) remains negative while the second becomes positive.  Meanwhile, the third 
term is always positive.  In this case, the downstream firms’ input substitutability, 
together with the upstream firms’ input substitutability has power to change the 
direction of a tax reform from  0Et >   and  0Yt <   to  0Et <   and  0Yt > .  
Therefore, in my model where the distortion from pollution is simultaneously 
considered along with other distortions from imperfect competition in both industries,  
Yσ  cannot solely determine the direction of tax reforms in general. Only the profit 
wedges and the upstream firms’ input substitutability can change the direction of tax 





In this chapter, I have examined the welfare effects of various revenue-neutral 
tax reforms in the case of two vertically-separated oligopolies (downstream and 
upstream), where the upstream industry is polluting. My results have shown analytically 
when and how government can improve welfare by initiating various tax reforms, 
regardless of either the feasibility of a lump sum transfer or the availability of a tax on 
pollution. 
The profit wedges that is the deffrence between the unit price and the unit cost 
and the marginal environmental damages (MED) becomes important deciding the 
direction of a tax reform.  In general, if the MED is more damaging to social welfare 
than the marginalization problem due to under-production does, government should 
levy a tax on pollution (or on the intermediate good) and use this revenue to subsidize 
the downstream industry. On the other hand, if the environmental damages are less 
pressing, the direction of a tax reform should be reversed to the combination of a 
subsidy for pollution (or for the intermediate good) and a tax on the downstream output. 
If the pollution problem is less severe than the upstream industry’s 
marginalization problem but is more severe than the double marginalization problems in 
both industries, the direction of a tax reform can be determined only when 
informationameters is available. In this case, the downstream firms’ input 
substitutability becomes important, because it weakens the upstream industry’s market 
power. If it is strong enough, then the direction of a tax reform can be restored to a tax 
on pollution (or on the intermediate good) and a subsidy for the downstream output. A 
tax on the intermediate good has this input substitution effect by the downstream firms 
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and, therefore, can be used as a corrective tax instrument even in vertically-separated 
oligopolies with a pollution problem. 
However, a tax on pollution is superior to a tax on intermediate good, because 
the former always brings in positive welfare effect from the upstream firms’ input 
substitutability, which a tax on intermediate good cannot provide. And if this input 
substitution effect by the upstream firms is strong enough, then the direction of a tax 
reform can be restored to a tax on pollution (or on the intermediate good) and a subsidy 
for the downstream output even if the relative size of industry profits to environmental 
damages alone does not give policy makers a clear-cut conclusion about the direction of 
a tax reform. 
I have used some simplifying assumptions in my model to obtain the 
analytically tractable results.  First, in order to analyze the upstream producers’ input 
substitutability resulting from a tax on pollution, I have postulated the upstream cost 
function as a function of the full price of polluting the environment, which is assumed 
to be the sum of the hidden, internal price of using the environment as an input and a 
tax on pollution. And I have used a simplifying assumption that the relationship 
between these two prices is linear and that the implicit internal price for using the 
environment does not change as a tax on pollution is introduced. However, if these two 
price factors are related to each other, the results might turn out differently. 
Second, I have nSecond, I have not examined the optimal taxation problem here 
since government does not have any revenue requirement in my model. But it would be 
more difficult to solve an optimal taxation problem, and it might be possible to derive 




















Appendix of Chapter 1 
A.1 DERIVATION OF (1.19) 
From the zero-profits condition, 
 
 ( ) ( ),  1Y Y Y Dp F L D L t D= + + . (A1.1) 
Totally differentiating it: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),  1
YY Y Y L Y D Y D D
F L D dp p F dL F dD dL t dD Ddt+ + = + + + . 
Plugging the first-order conditions from the profit maximization into it: 
 
 Y DYdp Ddt= . (A1.2) 
Dividing the both sides of (A1.2) by  Yp   gives (1.19). 
 
A.2 HOW TO SOLVE THE SYSTEM OF EQUATIONS 




















⎤⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎥+ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎥⎦
. (A2.1) 
Defining the elasticity of substitution between two manufactured goods ( )Qσ  
as  ( ) ( )d Y X Y X   divided by  ( ) ( )Y X Y Xd c p c p ,  a behavioral equation can 




 Ŷ ˆ ˆQ YX cσ= − . (A2.2) 
Totally differentiate the household's budget constraint and use (1.19), (1.21), and 
(A2.2) to get: 
 
 X̂ ˆ ˆ ˆQ YL w cφσ= + + , (A2.3) 
where  ( ) ( )1 1Y Lt Y t Lφ ≡ + − ,  which is the ratio of the consumer expenditure to 
a polluting manufactured good to the after-tax income from market labor. 
Plug (A2.3) into (A2.2), then:  
 
 Ŷ ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1Q YL w cσ φ= + − − . (A2.4) 
Defining the elasticity of substitution between inputs in production of  Y   
( )Yσ  as  ( ) ( )Y Yd L D L D   divided by  ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1D Dd t t+ + ,  a behavioral 
equation can be obtained as follows: 
 
 ŶL ˆ ˆY DD tσ= + . (A2.5) 
The first-order conditions from the profit maximization imply that  
( )1Y DdY dL t dD= + + .  Thus, the percentage change in  Y   can be expressed as 
a weighted average of the percentage changes in the two inputs: 
 




⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠




⎛ ⎞⎟⎜+ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. (A2.6) 
Substitute (A2.5) into (A2.6) and use the zero-profits condition  









⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. (A2.7) 
The definition of the consumer price of  Y   is given Y Y Yc p t= + .  Totally 
differentiating it, 
 
 Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
dc p dp dt
c p t p p t
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟= +⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 







⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
. (A2.8) 











⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ +⎝ ⎠
. (A2.9) 
Now, the equations (1.14), (1.15), (1.21), (1.23), (A2.2), (A2.3), (A2.5), (A2.6), 
and (A2.9) are a system of simultaneous equations that can be solved for the nine 
endogenous variables (dU Lλ ,  L̂t ,  X̂ ,  Ŷ ,  D̂ ,  ŵ ,  L̂ ,  ŶL ,  and  Ŷc ) as 
functions of exogenous parameters and two exogenous policy variables,  Ŷt   and  
D̂t .  Then, for any particular policy experiment, one of these two tax rate changes will 
be set to zero in order to look at the effects of the other, where the change in revenue is 
offset by an adjustment in the labor tax  Lt . 
 
 116
In order to solve the nine equations, they need to be reduced to fewer equations.  
To get the expression for the change in emissions ( )D̂ , substitute (1.22) into (A2.4) 





( ) ( )[ ]
( )
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ




L Y L Y
D
t tL D c
Y Y
t t t t
L L
ε σ φ ε
ε ε
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎟⎜+⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎟⎜ ⎟ − − +⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜− + ⎢ + ⎥ − + ⎢ + ⎥⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭
. (B10) 
Equate (A2.10) with (A2.7) and use (A2.9) to get  D̂   in (1.24).  For  Ŷ   in 
(1.25),  substitute (1.24) into (A2.7).  Finally, for  L̂   in (1.26), substitute (1.24) 
and (1.25) into (A2.1). 
 
A.3 THE LIST OF POLLUTING INDUSTRIES 
 Coal Mining and Dressing 
 Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 
 Ferrous Metals Mining and Dressing 
 Nonferrous Metals Mining and Dressing  
 Nonmetal Minerals Mining and Dressing 
 Logging and Transport of Timber and Bamboo 
 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 
 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products 
 Furniture Manufacturing; Papermaking and Paper Products 
 Petroleum Processing and Coking 
 Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 
 Chemical Fiber; Rubber Products 
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 Plastic Products 
 Nonmetal Mineral Products 
 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 
 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 
 Metal Products 
 Transport Equipment 
 Production and Supply of Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water 





Appendix of Chapter 3 
B.1 DERIVATION OF EQUATION (3.12) 
Since the aggregate demand  ( ) ( ),  ,  YqX c q w Y p w= ⋅   by Shepard’s lemma,  
Y Y






qq q p qqX
Y
q





≡ − = −  (B1.1) 
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Define the substitution elasticity between labor and intermediate good in 
downstream production as: 
 
 
( ) ( )
DY DY DY DY
DY DY DY DY
Y
X X dX dLd





⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ − ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟≡ − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠




where  DYX   and  DYL   denote the input demands for the intermediate good and 
for labor by the downstream firm, respectively. 
By Shepard’s lemma,  DY YqX c Y=    and   
DY Y
wL c Y= .  Totally 
differentiate these to obtain  ( )DY Y Yqq qwdX c dq c dw Y= +    and  
( )DY Y Ywq wwdL c dq c dw Y= + ,  respectively.  Therefore, 
 
 .
Y Y Y YDY DY
qq qw wq ww
DY DY Y Y
q w
c dq c dw c dq c dwdX dL
X L c c
+ +
− = −  (B1.5) 
 
Since the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in  ( ),  q w ,  
Y Y Y
q wc c q c w= +   by Euler’s formula.  Differentiate it with respect to  q   and  w   
to obtain: 
 












⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= − = ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (B1.6) 
and Y Ywq qwc c= . 
Substitute the above expressions into (B1.5) to get: 
 
 
( )Y Y YDY DY qq q w
DY DY Y Y
q w
qc qc wcdX dL dq dw
X L wc c q w
+ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− = − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. (B1.7) 









σ = − . (B1.8) 
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Simplify (B1.2) using (B1.8) to finally get (3.12). 
Similarly, the substitution elasticity between  E   and  XL   by the upstream 









σ = − . (B1.9) 
 
 
B.2 DERIVATION OF EQUATION (3.26) 
Substitute the definitions for  CS ,  XΠ ,  and  YΠ   into (3.22) to get: 
 
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1 1
,
X X Y Y Y
q
pY
W U Y D E
w
t q c c Y t p c Y T
w
= − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+
 (B2.1) 
 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ),  ,  ,  YqX X q w c q w Y p w= = ⋅ ,  ( ),  Y Y p w= ,  ( ),  
X Xc c r w= ,  
( ),  X Xr rc c r w= ,  ( ),  
Y Yc c q w= ,  ( ),  Y Yq qc c q w= ,  ( ),  ,  X Y Ep p t t t= ,  
( ),  ,  X Y Eq q t t t= ,  and  ( ) ( ) ( )X X Yr r qD D E D c X D c c Y= = = . 
From (B2.1), 
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W p q qX
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where  pW W p≡ ∂ ∂ ,  qW W q≡ ∂ ∂ ,  and  ( )
22X X
rrc c r≡ ∂ ∂ . 
Substitute (B2.2), (B2.3), and (B2.4) into (3-25) and use  
X X X X X
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Plug (B2.6) and (B2.7) into (B2.5) and set  0X Y Et t t T= = = = ,  then (3-
26) is obtained. 
 
 
B.3 DERIVATION OF EQUATION (3.31) 
Totally differentiate (3-22) to get: 
 
 X Y E
X Y E
W W W






Rewrite it using (3-30): 
 
 X E
X Y E Y
W W qX W W E
dW dt dt
t t pY t t pY
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= − + −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (B3.2) 
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